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Copy Markdown MCP server

io.github.michaelvereb/copymarkdownmichaelverebstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned

Extract clean markdown, DESIGN.md specs, and link graphs from any URL for LLMs.

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 4
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

anlyon.dev does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Its sign-in does not let Anlyon set up an OAuth client on its own, so there is no link to it here.

What the Copy Markdown MCP server can do

The Copy Markdown MCP server is published by the GitHub account michaelvereb. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: url_to_markdown, generate_content_md, generate_design_md and generate_links_md), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (url_to_markdown, generate_content_md, generate_design_md and 1 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (url_to_markdown, generate_content_md, generate_design_md and 1 more).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since anlyon.dev first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • generate_content_mdExtract the core article or documentation body from any URL into a standardized CONTENT.md format, stripping headers, footers, and advertising noise.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_content_md" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_content_md" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_content_md" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract the core article or documentation body from any URL into a standardized CONTENT.md format, stripping headers, footers, and advertising noise.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • generate_design_mdExtract a standardized DESIGN.md from any URL — CSS custom properties, typography hierarchy, button/card specifications, color palettes, and AI layout guidelines.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_design_md" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_design_md" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_design_md" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract a standardized DESIGN.md from any URL — CSS custom properties, typography hierarchy, button/card specifications, color palettes, and AI layout guidelines.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • url_to_markdownExtract clean, token-efficient Markdown from any public URL with headings, tables, code blocks, and links intact.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract clean, token-efficient Markdown from any public URL with headings, tables, code blocks, and links intact.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 12, 2026, 10:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://www.copymarkdown.md/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://www.copymarkdown.md
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.copymarkdown.md/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including url_to_markdown (write), generate_content_md (write), generate_design_md (write), generate_links_md (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 warn
  • The server marks "generate_content_md" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_content_md" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_design_md" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_design_md" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_links_md" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_links_md" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http copymarkdown https://www.copymarkdown.md/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http copymarkdown https://www.copymarkdown.md/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__copymarkdown__url_to_markdown",
      "mcp__copymarkdown__generate_content_md",
      "mcp__copymarkdown__generate_design_md",
      "mcp__copymarkdown__generate_links_md"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as copymarkdown. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__copymarkdown__url_to_markdown untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__copymarkdown__generate_content_md untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__copymarkdown__generate_design_md untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__copymarkdown__generate_links_md untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.michaelvereb/copymarkdown/verify?hash=89ce77ededaf98f48d5290375475f920c9e5bfb5e96f2b0b8797bcf822711346" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 89ce77ededaf, from Nov 12, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.michaelvereb/copymarkdown/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

anlyon.dev badge for io.github.michaelvereb/copymarkdown
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/io.github.michaelvereb/copymarkdown.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.michaelvereb/copymarkdown)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Copy Markdown MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Copy Markdown MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Copy Markdown MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Copy Markdown MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Copy Markdown MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. url_to_markdown, generate_content_md, generate_design_md and generate_links_md.

Does the Copy Markdown MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Copy Markdown MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): url_to_markdown, generate_content_md, generate_design_md and generate_links_md.

Has the Copy Markdown MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since anlyon.dev started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.