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llms-text MCP server

io.github.michaelvereb/llms-textmichaelverebstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned

Generate, validate, and deep-crawl /llms.txt and /llms-full.txt files for AI agents.

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the llms-text MCP server can do

The llms-text MCP server is published by the GitHub account michaelvereb. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: generate_llms_txt and generate_llms_full_txt), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (generate_llms_txt, generate_llms_full_txt and validate_llms_txt); 3 tools can send data out of your system (generate_llms_txt, generate_llms_full_txt and validate_llms_txt).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since anlyon.dev first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • generate_llms_full_txtDeep-crawl up to 50 pages of a website to generate a comprehensive /llms-full.txt content index with full body markdown for AI agents.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_llms_full_txt" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_llms_full_txt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_llms_full_txt" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deep-crawl up to 50 pages of a website to generate a comprehensive /llms-full.txt content index with full body markdown for AI agents. Generates full bundle immediately when session authorization is provided.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • generate_llms_txtAutomatically crawl any public website URL and generate a standard, token-efficient index-level /llms.txt file for AI agent context.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_llms_txt" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_llms_txt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_llms_txt" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Automatically crawl any public website URL and generate a standard, token-efficient index-level /llms.txt file for AI agent context. 100% free with core page categorization, descriptions, and clean markdown.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • validate_llms_txtValidate any public llms.txt or llms-full.txt file URL for standard compliance, missing H1, broken links, structure errors, and token count.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_llms_txt" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate any public llms.txt or llms-full.txt file URL for standard compliance, missing H1, broken links, structure errors, and token count.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 12, 2026, 10:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.llms-text.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_llms_txt (write), generate_llms_full_txt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "generate_llms_txt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_llms_txt" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_llms_full_txt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_llms_full_txt" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http llms-text https://www.llms-text.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http llms-text https://www.llms-text.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__llms-text__generate_llms_txt",
      "mcp__llms-text__generate_llms_full_txt",
      "mcp__llms-text__validate_llms_txt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as llms-text. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__llms-text__generate_llms_txt untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__llms-text__generate_llms_full_txt untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__llms-text__validate_llms_txt untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.michaelvereb/llms-text/verify?hash=b06d3e79a0161b14e52627543d10e6df17fee4c7bac218aae424cb10b8f52ce6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b06d3e79a016, from Nov 12, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.michaelvereb/llms-text/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

anlyon.dev badge for io.github.michaelvereb/llms-text
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/io.github.michaelvereb/llms-text.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.michaelvereb/llms-text)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

llms-text MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the llms-text MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the llms-text MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the llms-text MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the llms-text MCP server have?

3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. generate_llms_txt, generate_llms_full_txt and validate_llms_txt.

Does the llms-text MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the llms-text MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): generate_llms_txt, generate_llms_full_txt and validate_llms_txt.

Has the llms-text MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since anlyon.dev started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.