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Clipwright MCP server

com.eliteaiempire/clipwrighteliteaiempire.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Automated long-form-to-shorts clipping with a rights gate that refuses unlicensed footage. Own conte

9 tools: 6 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Clipwright MCP server can do

The Clipwright MCP server is published by eliteaiempire.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: clipwright_check_rights, clipwright_register_grant, clipwright_create_clips, clipwright_schedule and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool can send data out of your system (clipwright_tiktok_post_draft).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • clipwright_check_rightsAsk the rights gate whether a source may be clipped.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask the rights gate whether a source may be clipped. Returns ALLOW or REFUSE with the reason. Deny-by-default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • clipwright_create_clipsCreate vertical 9:16 captioned clips from a source.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "clipwright_create_clips" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create vertical 9:16 captioned clips from a source. Refuses with 403 unless a rights grant covers the source. Requires confirm=true.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • clipwright_export_dataExport everything stored for this key (jobs with clip metadata, rights grants, schedule intents) as JSON.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Export everything stored for this key (jobs with clip metadata, rights grants, schedule intents) as JSON.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • clipwright_register_grantRegister a rights grant: kind is one of owned | program_brief | licence_file | open_licence.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register a rights grant: kind is one of owned | program_brief | licence_file | open_licence. Verified by execution at registration. Requires confirm=true.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • clipwright_scheduleRecord a publish intent for the Empire Distributor.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "clipwright_schedule" says "schedule": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Record a publish intent for the Empire Distributor. Publishes nothing (no platform token exists); returns publish_state NOT_PUBLISHED. Requires confirm=true.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • clipwright_tiktok_post_draftF6015/S3: DRAFT ONLY.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "clipwright_tiktok_post_draft" says "post": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "clipwright_tiktok_post_draft" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "clipwright_tiktok_post_draft" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true}; The name "clipwright_tiktok_post_draft" says "post": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    F6015/S3: DRAFT ONLY. Returns the same creator_info (nickname, privacy options, interaction/duration limits) a human sees on the compliant per-post TikTok screen. NEVER posts -- there is no tool that does; posting requires an explicit human click on the dashboard, one post at a time, even once the app passes TikTok's audit.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • clipwright_get_usageRead this key's plan, monthly source-video usage against the limit, and metered call counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "clipwright_get_usage" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read this key's plan, monthly source-video usage against the limit, and metered call counts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • clipwright_job_statusFetch a clip job's status and rendered clips.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "clipwright_job_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a clip job's status and rendered clips.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • clipwright_list_programsList the opt-in clipper programmes Clipwright can legally clip for (the rights holder grants the licence in the campaign brief).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "clipwright_list_programs" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the opt-in clipper programmes Clipwright can legally clip for (the rights holder grants the licence in the campaign brief).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 10, 2026, 08:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://clipwright.eliteaiempire.com/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including clipwright_check_rights (write), clipwright_register_grant (write), clipwright_create_clips (write), clipwright_schedule (write), clipwright_tiktok_post_draft (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "clipwright_tiktok_post_draft" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true}; The name "clipwright_tiktok_post_draft" says "post": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http clipwright https://clipwright.eliteaiempire.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http clipwright https://clipwright.eliteaiempire.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_list_programs",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_job_status",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_get_usage"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_check_rights",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_register_grant",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_create_clips",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_schedule",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_tiktok_post_draft",
      "mcp__clipwright__clipwright_export_data"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as clipwright. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__clipwright__clipwright_tiktok_post_draft outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/com.eliteaiempire/clipwright/verify?hash=b119ffdf2ce7f42c07b7d6fda7d108e6d136c3c47f5ea36acf5f28ec1d69d0ba" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b119ffdf2ce7, from Nov 9, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.eliteaiempire/clipwright/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

anlyon.dev badge for com.eliteaiempire/clipwright
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/com.eliteaiempire/clipwright.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.eliteaiempire/clipwright)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Clipwright MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Clipwright MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Clipwright MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Clipwright MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Clipwright MCP server have?

9 tools: 6 write, 3 read. clipwright_check_rights, clipwright_register_grant, clipwright_create_clips, clipwright_schedule, clipwright_tiktok_post_draft, clipwright_export_data, clipwright_list_programs, clipwright_job_status and 1 more.

Does the Clipwright MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Clipwright MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): clipwright_tiktok_post_draft.

Has the Clipwright MCP server changed its tools?

Not since anlyon.dev started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.