NewsletterProAI MCP server
com.eliteaiempire/newsletterproaieliteaiempire.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
NewsletterProAI drafts a real newsletter issue from your own notes and sends a real test delivery th
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the NewsletterProAI MCP server can do
The NewsletterProAI MCP server is published by eliteaiempire.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: newsletter_draft) and create or change data (2 tools: newsletter_about and newsletter_pricing). 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (newsletter_draft); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (newsletter_draft).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
newsletter_draftReturns a subject line and HTML body written from your topic and notes.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "note": it reads notes.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns a subject line and HTML body written from your topic and notes. Needs a write-scoped key; each call is metered. Pricing: {"unit": "call", "price_usd": null, "pricing_url": "https://newsletterproai.eliteaiempire.com/pricing", "free_quota": 0, "per_key_daily_cap": 25, "note": "Needs a scoped API key. The per-call price is not published yet; keys are issued on request."}.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
newsletter_aboutWhat NewsletterPro AI does and what is free Pricing: {"unit": "call", "price_usd": 0, "free_quota": "200 per day per IP", "note": "Keyed volume pricing is published at https://news…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it What NewsletterPro AI does and what is free Pricing: {"unit": "call", "price_usd": 0, "free_quota": "200 per day per IP", "note": "Keyed volume pricing is published at https://newsletterproai.eliteaiempire.com/pricing"}.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
newsletter_pricingWhere prices live and what costs nothing Pricing: {"unit": "call", "price_usd": 0, "free_quota": "200 per day per IP", "note": "Keyed volume pricing is published at https://newslet…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Where prices live and what costs nothing Pricing: {"unit": "call", "price_usd": 0, "free_quota": "200 per day per IP", "note": "Keyed volume pricing is published at https://newsletterproai.eliteaiempire.com/pricing"}.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
usage_getUsage for the calling key (last 30 days)No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "usage_get" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Usage for the calling key (last 30 days)
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 10, 2026, 08:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-03-26
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://newsletterproai.eliteaiempire.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including newsletter_draft (destructive), newsletter_about (write), newsletter_pricing (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http newsletterproai https://newsletterproai.eliteaiempire.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http newsletterproai https://newsletterproai.eliteaiempire.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__newsletterproai__usage_get"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__newsletterproai__newsletter_about",
"mcp__newsletterproai__newsletter_pricing"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__newsletterproai__newsletter_draft"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as newsletterproai. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__newsletterproai__newsletter_draft private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/com.eliteaiempire/newsletterproai/verify?hash=6339ef7ecb46aea714e7dda14a75c9267ac3e8d73a57a1fb3ca81b7fdac98128" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6339ef7ecb46, from Nov 9, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.eliteaiempire/newsletterproai/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.eliteaiempire/newsletterproai)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 17:17 UTC.
NewsletterProAI MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the NewsletterProAI MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the NewsletterProAI MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: newsletter_draft.
Can the NewsletterProAI MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the NewsletterProAI MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. newsletter_draft, newsletter_about, newsletter_pricing and usage_get.
Does the NewsletterProAI MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the NewsletterProAI MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the NewsletterProAI MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since anlyon.dev started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.