TopxAI Models MCP server
xyz.topxai.api/modelsapi.topxai.xyzstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Ask Claude, GPT, Grok, GLM, Kimi or DeepSeek from your client; token price plus a $0.001 call fee.
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the TopxAI Models MCP server can do
The TopxAI Models MCP server is published by api.topxai.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (ask_model) and create or change data (1 tool: judge), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (ask_model).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
ask_modelSend a prompt to one text model of the TopxAI catalogue and return its reply.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe description's first verb is "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a prompt to one text model of the TopxAI catalogue and return its reply. The models reason before they answer and the reasoning counts toward max_output_tokens, so leave at least 4096 tokens for a full answer or pass a lower reasoning_effort. Billed at the model's token price, reasoning included, plus a $0.001 call fee; the reply reports the exact charge.
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
judgeAsk TypeSafe's Jev (a System One model) typed questions about a piece of text and get calibrated numbers back, not prose: a probability for a yes/no question (type noul), one optio…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask TypeSafe's Jev (a System One model) typed questions about a piece of text and get calibrated numbers back, not prose: a probability for a yes/no question (type noul), one option with a probability per option (type choice, with criteria), or a value on a scale with a probability per anchor (type score, with anchors). Billed at Jev's input-token price plus a $0.001 call fee.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_modelsList the text models this API key can ask, with their USD prices per million tokens, the reasoning efforts each takes and the call fee.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_models" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the text models this API key can ask, with their USD prices per million tokens, the reasoning efforts each takes and the call fee.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 13, 2026, 11:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.topxai.xyz/mcp/models: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including ask_model (irreversible), judge (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http models https://api.topxai.xyz/mcp/models --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http models https://api.topxai.xyz/mcp/models --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__models__list_models"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__models__ask_model",
"mcp__models__judge"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as models. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__models__ask_model outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/xyz.topxai.api/models/verify?hash=eca7c2c72272f934ceeb7dde1fb954a4ea2ede3f93041bac2377160f7911e87d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash eca7c2c72272, from Nov 13, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/xyz.topxai.api/models/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/xyz.topxai.api/models)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
TopxAI Models MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the TopxAI Models MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the TopxAI Models MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the TopxAI Models MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: ask_model.
What tools does the TopxAI Models MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. ask_model, judge and list_models.
Does the TopxAI Models MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the TopxAI Models MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): ask_model.
Has the TopxAI Models MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since anlyon.dev started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.