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Prescan

xyz.canisell/prescancanisell.xyzstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Agent security pre-checks: prompt-injection scan, MCP tool-poisoning scan, x402 endpoint check.

6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 1 finding, 1 high

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • aboutFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. What Prescan does, prices of the paid tools and HTTP endpoints, and links to docs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_x402_endpointIs this x402 endpoint safe to pay?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Is this x402 endpoint safe to pay? Fetches its 402 terms with one GET (never pays) and checks: payTo validity and EIP-55 checksum, zero/token-contract/OFAC-sanctioned payTo, asset is canonical USDC for the network, amount vs your budget, price vs the price advertised in its OpenAPI and on x402scan, payTo vs the one x402scan recorded, HTTPS, redirects, resource host, domain age (RDAP), tunnels/shared hosts. Returns go/caution/no_go, the recommended payment option and findings. Costs $0.003 USDC per call via x402 (charged only on success). Without an x402 wallet you get the payment terms and the paid HTTP URL instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_textPrompt-injection pre-check for text your agent is about to read (tool output, web page, email, document, token names/metadata).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prompt-injection pre-check for text your agent is about to read (tool output, web page, email, document, token names/metadata). Deterministic rules, no LLM: instruction override (EN/DE/FR/ES/IT/PT/PL/RU), role hijack, jailbreaks, system-prompt extraction, fake chat delimiters, text addressed to the AI, concealment, data exfiltration (markdown-image beacons, secrets to URLs), tool/fund hijack (shell pipes, transfers, unlimited approvals, skip-confirmation), crypto lures (seed-phrase requests, claim/airdrop links), hidden text (zero-width, Unicode tag and variation-selector smuggling, bidi, homoglyphs, CSS-hidden HTML, ANSI) and encoded payloads (base64/hex/percent decoded and re-scanned). Returns verdict safe/suspicious/malicious, action allow/treat_as_untrusted_data/block, 0-100 score, findings with character spans, risky links, decoded payloads and a sanitized copy. Batch up to 100 texts per call. Costs $0.002 USDC per call via x402 (charged only on success). Without an x402 wallet you get the payment terms and the paid HTTP URL instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_toolsTool-poisoning scan of MCP tool definitions (a tools/list result) or function schemas before your agent connects or calls them: hidden <IMPORTANT> instructions, cross-tool shadowin…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.server.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "<IMPORTANT>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.

      Matched text

      description: "...ur agent connects or calls them: hidden <IMPORTANT> instructions, cross-tool shadowing, sid..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Tool-poisoning scan of MCP tool definitions (a tools/list result) or function schemas before your agent connects or calls them: hidden <IMPORTANT> instructions, cross-tool shadowing, side-channel parameters that ask for file/conversation contents, recipient/payee overrides, instructions hidden in parameter names, defaults or enums, Unicode/ANSI smuggling, duplicate or lookalike tool names. Per-tool verdict and findings with location, plus capability flags (shell, files, network, payments, messaging). Costs $0.002 USDC per call via x402 (charged only on success). Without an x402 wallet you get the payment terms and the paid HTTP URL instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_rulesFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_rules" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. The detection categories, rule counts and thresholds used by scan_text and scan_tools.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • preview_scan_textFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "preview_scan_text" says "preview": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. Prompt-injection pre-check for up to 1000 characters: verdict (safe/suspicious/malicious), score, categories and rule ids. For spans, a sanitized copy, long texts or batches use scan_text (paid).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high
  • Highscan_tools

    The description contains "<IMPORTANT>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.

    Matched text

    description: "...ur agent connects or calls them: hidden <IMPORTANT> instructions, cross-tool shadowing, sid..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http prescan https://prescan.canisell.xyz/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http prescan https://prescan.canisell.xyz/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__prescan__preview_scan_text",
      "mcp__prescan__list_rules"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__prescan__scan_text",
      "mcp__prescan__scan_tools",
      "mcp__prescan__check_x402_endpoint",
      "mcp__prescan__about"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as prescan. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__prescan__scan_text untrusted-input
  • mcp__prescan__scan_tools untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__prescan__check_x402_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/xyz.canisell/prescan/verify?hash=fd68942dac6a92f4ac4d2a04fd3ff1517c03dfc78eaf591923507a7f70331dcc" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash fd68942dac6a, from Nov 2, 2026, 19:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/xyz.canisell/prescan/changes.xml

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Badge

anlyon.dev badge for xyz.canisell/prescan
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/xyz.canisell/prescan.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/xyz.canisell/prescan)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 2, 2026, 20:18 UTC.