secondlayer MCP server
tools.secondlayer/secondlayersecondlayer.toolsstreamable-httpv11.6.6Scanned
Stacks chain data: contracts, events, transfers, subgraph scaffolds. Hosted with browser sign-in.
15 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 7 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the secondlayer MCP server can do
The secondlayer MCP server is published by secondlayer.tools, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 15 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (index_ft_transfers and index_nft_transfers) and create or change data (6 tools: subgraphs_scaffold, index_contract_calls, index_print_schema, index_discover and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (streams_dumps and account_whoami); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (batch_query, streams_dumps and account_whoami); 2 tools can send data out of your system (index_ft_transfers and index_nft_transfers). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 11.6.6.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
15 tools
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
index_ft_transfersList decoded SIP-010 fungible-token transfers from Index.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "index_ft_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it List decoded SIP-010 fungible-token transfers from Index. Reads are keyless.
index_nft_transfersList decoded SIP-009 non-fungible-token transfers from Index.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "index_nft_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it List decoded SIP-009 non-fungible-token transfers from Index. Reads are keyless.
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
batch_queryRun up to 10 public /v1 reads in one round trip (POST /v1/batch).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "batch_query" says "query": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "run" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Run up to 10 public /v1 reads in one round trip (POST /v1/batch). Each item keeps its own auth/quota/pay-per-call semantics; results return in order with per-item status. Paths must start with /v1/index, /v1/subgraphs, /v1/streams, or /v1/contracts.
index_contract_callsList decoded contract calls from the Index (function name, args, result).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "index_contract_calls" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it List decoded contract calls from the Index (function name, args, result). Set `trait` (e.g. sip-010) to match calls to all contracts conforming to a standard. Note: contract-call cursors are a SEPARATE keyspace from event cursors — they are not interchangeable.
index_discoverDiscover the Index vocabulary: every event type and its columns, allowed/equality filters, and required-non-null fields (and which types accept `trait`).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Discover the Index vocabulary: every event type and its columns, allowed/equality filters, and required-non-null fields (and which types accept `trait`). Read this before building Index queries instead of guessing filters. Anonymous read.
index_print_schemaEmpirical per-topic print payload schemas for a contract, inferred from sampled on-chain events: each topic's fields with observed Clarity types, decoded TS types, subgraph column …No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Empirical per-topic print payload schemas for a contract, inferred from sampled on-chain events: each topic's fields with observed Clarity types, decoded TS types, subgraph column types, and presence rates. Use before writing print_event subgraph handlers to learn what's on e.data. Anonymous read.
streams_tipCurrent canonical chain tip as Streams sees it: block height/hash, burn height, finalized_height, lag_seconds, and the oldest seekable height/cursor for this key's retention window…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Current canonical chain tip as Streams sees it: block height/hash, burn height, finalized_height, lag_seconds, and the oldest seekable height/cursor for this key's retention window. Call it before a cursor walk to know where the stream ends, and after an ingest to check lag.
subgraphs_scaffoldGenerate a subgraph from observed print events when available; ABI token transfers or public functions only when the contract has never printed.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a subgraph from observed print events when available; ABI token transfers or public functions only when the contract has never printed. Review the TypeScript, run subgraphs_test until ok: true with written >= 1, read skipped, then subgraphs_deploy. dryRun is DDL only.
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
account_whoamiShow the archive account email at api.secondlayer.tools, not the self-host instance.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "account_whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "show" and "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "show" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Show the archive account email at api.secondlayer.tools, not the self-host instance.
contracts_findDiscover deployed Stacks contracts conforming to a trait (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "contracts_find" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Discover deployed Stacks contracts conforming to a trait (e.g. "sip-010", "sip-009", "sip-013"). The discovery endpoint for "which contracts implement X". Reads are public.
contracts_get_abiFetch a single deployed contract's ABI from the registry (prod-safe).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "contracts_get_abi" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a single deployed contract's ABI from the registry (prod-safe). Returns the contract's metadata + full ABI (functions, maps, variables, fungible/non-fungible tokens). Returns not_found if the contract isn't in the registry. Use it to inspect a contract before subgraphs_scaffold.
index_blocksList decoded blocks from Index.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List decoded blocks from Index. Reads are keyless.
index_eventsList decoded chain events from the Index by event type.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List decoded chain events from the Index by event type. Use this for event types without a dedicated tool (stx_*, ft_mint/burn, nft_mint/burn, print), and for trait-scoped queries: set `trait` (e.g. sip-010) to match all contracts conforming to a standard — pair with contracts_find to discover traits. For ft/nft transfers without a trait prefer index_ft_transfers / index_nft_transfers.
index_transactionsList decoded transactions from Index.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List decoded transactions from Index. Filter by type, sender, or contract. Reads are keyless.
streams_dumpsList the Streams bulk parquet dumps manifest — coverage range, latest_finalized_cursor, and per-file metadata (block range, row count, size, sha256, signed URL).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List the Streams bulk parquet dumps manifest — coverage range, latest_finalized_cursor, and per-file metadata (block range, row count, size, sha256, signed URL). This is the cold backfill path for downloading all raw data; fetch the file URLs directly (e.g. with DuckDB). Requires the dumps base URL to be configured (SL_STREAMS_DUMPS_URL). For live reads use REST GET /v1/streams/events; for tip/lag use streams_tip.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
12 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 outbound tools breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__secondlayer__index_ft_transfers",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_nft_transfers"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 13, 2026, 11:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 8
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://api.secondlayer.tools/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://api.secondlayer.tools
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.secondlayer.tools/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including index_ft_transfers (irreversible), index_nft_transfers (irreversible), subgraphs_scaffold (write), index_contract_calls (write), index_print_schema (write) and 3 more
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 8
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://api.secondlayer.tools/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 8 (and 3 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 8
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://api.secondlayer.tools/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
Install
Pinned to version 11.6.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http secondlayer https://api.secondlayer.tools/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http secondlayer https://api.secondlayer.tools/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__secondlayer__index_events",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_blocks",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_transactions",
"mcp__secondlayer__streams_dumps",
"mcp__secondlayer__contracts_find",
"mcp__secondlayer__contracts_get_abi",
"mcp__secondlayer__account_whoami"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__secondlayer__subgraphs_scaffold",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_ft_transfers",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_nft_transfers",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_contract_calls",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_print_schema",
"mcp__secondlayer__index_discover",
"mcp__secondlayer__batch_query",
"mcp__secondlayer__streams_tip"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as secondlayer. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__secondlayer__index_ft_transfers outbound
- mcp__secondlayer__index_nft_transfers outbound
- mcp__secondlayer__batch_query untrusted-input
- mcp__secondlayer__streams_dumps private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__secondlayer__account_whoami private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/tools.secondlayer/secondlayer/verify?hash=bc40253cfd78f6adeb2e6ea9c0ab8ab258b0e256aea88106b8e628ae663a6f44" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash bc40253cfd78, from Nov 9, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/tools.secondlayer/secondlayer/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/tools.secondlayer/secondlayer)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
secondlayer MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the secondlayer MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 15 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the secondlayer MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the secondlayer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: index_ft_transfers and index_nft_transfers.
What tools does the secondlayer MCP server have?
- 15 tools: 2 irreversible, 6 write, 7 read. index_ft_transfers, index_nft_transfers, subgraphs_scaffold, index_contract_calls, index_print_schema, index_discover, batch_query, streams_tip and 7 more.
Does the secondlayer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the secondlayer MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): index_ft_transfers and index_nft_transfers.
Has the secondlayer MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since anlyon.dev started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.