Image to Video AI MCP server
tools.imagetovideoai/image-to-videoimagetovideoai.toolsstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Turn an uploaded photo into an AI video. Preview the credit cost and get the finished video link.
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Image to Video AI MCP server can do
The Image to Video AI MCP server is published by imagetovideoai.tools, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: generate_video) and create or change data (1 tool: quote_generation). 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (generate_video and get_generation).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
generate_videoAnimate one uploaded photo.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_video" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Animate one uploaded photo. This spends credits. Get a quote first and confirm cost and visibility with the user. Retry with the same request_id and inputs.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
quote_generationCheck the credit cost and settings for turning an uploaded photo into a video.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check the credit cost and settings for turning an uploaded photo into a video. Does not start generation.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_generationCheck a task belonging to the connected account and get its video link when ready.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_generation" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a task belonging to the connected account and get its video link when ready.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_image_assetsList photos already uploaded to the connected account.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_image_assets" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List photos already uploaded to the connected account. Use an ID from this list to generate a video.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 11, 2026, 09:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://imagetovideoai.tools/api/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_video (destructive), quote_generation (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http image-to-video https://imagetovideoai.tools/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http image-to-video https://imagetovideoai.tools/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__image-to-video__list_image_assets",
"mcp__image-to-video__get_generation"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__image-to-video__quote_generation"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__image-to-video__generate_video"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as image-to-video. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__image-to-video__generate_video untrusted-input
- mcp__image-to-video__get_generation untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/tools.imagetovideoai/image-to-video/verify?hash=b44b094fe3df1275971d1eccd0746bc7db20b1dcd9eaa87c67ee2424e6b21521" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b44b094fe3df, from Nov 10, 2026, 12:19 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/tools.imagetovideoai/image-to-video/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/tools.imagetovideoai/image-to-video)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 12:19 UTC.
Image to Video AI MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Image to Video AI MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Image to Video AI MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: generate_video.
Can the Image to Video AI MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Image to Video AI MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 2 read. generate_video, quote_generation, list_image_assets and get_generation.
Does the Image to Video AI MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Image to Video AI MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Image to Video AI MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since anlyon.dev started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.