MONARK
by monarkgate.tech · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v0.4.0 · published by tech.monarkgate
Commit / defer / abstain over a conformal coverage region - not a probability of being right.
4 tools: 4 change things.
Scanned Oct 21, 2026
- Deletes or cancels0Claude Code: deny
- Can't be undone0Claude Code: ask
- Changes things4Claude Code: ask: see these tools
- Only reads0Claude Code: allow
1 check matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.
claude mcp add --transport http monark https://mcp.monarkgate.tech/mcpFindings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infogate
The description is 3,952 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool."
Tools
Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
attestprojection of a committed Shōgen-verified witness (Binance BTCUSDT, self-notarized); the verifier is NOT executed at call time.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it projection of a committed Shōgen-verified witness (Binance BTCUSDT, self-notarized); the verifier is NOT executed at call time.
calibratesplit-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it split-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores. MONARK does not see, store, or verify the caller's data or model, and does not validate that the supplied numbers are nonconformity scores of any model. Marginal 1−α coverage holds ONLY for future points exchangeable with the supplied scores; non-exchangeable data (e.g. distribution-shifted or time-ordered) voids it. Never a probability of being right.
cascadeEstimated liquidable amount from the real UKEMI cascade primitives (imported, never re-implemented): an Eisenberg-Noe clearing of the interbank system (L, e) with alpha=beta=1 yiel…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Estimated liquidable amount from the real UKEMI cascade primitives (imported, never re-implemented): an Eisenberg-Noe clearing of the interbank system (L, e) with alpha=beta=1 yields the largest clearing vector L*; each node is then read as a leveraged position — collateral is its cleared balance-sheet value (external assets plus interbank receipts under L*), debt is its nominal obligations, liquidation threshold K=1 — and liquidableAmount sums the debts of the nodes whose cleared value, once shocked by the caller-carried 24h fraction, no longer covers their obligations. Shocking the whole cleared value is a v0 simplification; no source supports shocking interbank receivables. yhat is that liquidable amount: a monetary quantity in the reference asset, a single point that HIKAE conformalizes downstream — no guarantee, no score. Downstream, no cascade calibration is committed; the gate abstains (under_calib) on this class. This cascade tool is v0, replaced at U-5.
gateCoverage-gated decision from the real HIKAE L3 policy (commit/defer/abstain) over a caller-carried authorization budget B_t.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description is 3,952 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool."
Description, as the server wrote it Coverage-gated decision from the real HIKAE L3 policy (commit/defer/abstain) over a caller-carried authorization budget B_t. Dispatches on task_class. The class 'btc-dir-15m' is retired and answers a named refusal. For 'cascade-liquidable-24h' no cascade calibration is committed; the gate abstains (under_calib) on this class. For 'stable-run-velocity-24h' (Narabi: a redemption-flow velocity forecast) the gate holds a committed stable-run velocity calibration for the USDe synthetic-dollar-whitelisted-redeem population (key narabi:persistence-v2@eip155:1/erc20:0x4c9edd5852cd905f086c759e8383e09bff1e68b3) over calm-window redemption flow; coverage is stated under the split-conformal bound of Barber, Candes, Ramdas and Tibshirani 2023 (Thm 2, unit weights): at least 1 − α minus the average total-variation gap between calibration windows and the next one; that gap is not estimated here and the calibration is measured non-stationary across half-years, so 1 − α is the coverage only if that gap is zero (exchangeability), which is not assumed here; no coverage is measured; on that key it requires alpha = 0.1, nMin = 50; for any other population, no stable-run velocity calibration is committed for this population; the gate abstains (under_calib). For 'liquidation-eligible-coverage' (Ukemi: a per-account liquidable-amount class, class A only) the served region is a conformal upper bound on the liquidable amount for the calibrated class; the lower edge is 0 by construction, not a calibrated bound; abstains (under_calib) outside it; this class requires alpha = 0.01, nMin = 100; calibrated on one recorded episode; no coverage is claimed on any other event; the H-3 exchangeability check is a report, a YES licenses nothing more; the bound holds only if yhat was produced by the frozen close-factor rule on a mono-collateral WETH account at the first crossing, which the gate does not check. The 32 kata classes `{btc,eth,bnb,sol}-{dir,range,mae-down,mae-up}-{1h,4h}` are served from their policy tables, which hold no committed calibration row: every well-formed kata call abstains with no region (under_calib, or non_evaluable on a dir lean of exactly 0), and no kata class has an attestation subject. A kata call carries a `predictor_id` of the form `kata:<kataId>@<venue>/<SYMBOL>/<h>` (no bucket, <h> the class horizon), a `features_digest`, alpha = 0.45, nMin = 6 on dir classes and alpha = 0.01, nMin = 299 on the others, tau at most 1 on dir classes, and a `produced_at` on the class horizon grid, received at most 300 s after it; the full request rules are in section 9 of the contract 1.1.0 specification. When the caller instead supplies a `calibration` (its own nonconformity scores plus a `mode`: `interval` ⇒ region [yhat - q̂, yhat + q̂], or `set` ⇒ a conformal set over caller `candidates`), the gate conformalizes against THOSE caller-supplied scores (BYO): split-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores. MONARK does not see, store, or verify the caller's data or model, and does not validate that the supplied numbers are nonconformity scores of any model. Marginal 1−α coverage holds ONLY for future points exchangeable with the supplied scores; non-exchangeable data (e.g. distribution-shifted or time-ordered) voids it. Never a probability of being right. A caller-carried `attested` price must declare a subject consistent with the committed task class (exact committed-URL membership; BYO classes do not accept `attested` in P1); the attestation is carried by the caller and is not re-verified at call time (the verifier is not executed here); `attest` only projects the committed witness — verify a caller-carried attestation offline with the Shōgen verifier; no temporal binding in P1. No served class has a committed attestation subject (the retired 'btc-dir-15m' held the only one), so any `attested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http monark https://mcp.monarkgate.tech/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__monark__gate",
"mcp__monark__cascade",
"mcp__monark__attest",
"mcp__monark__calibrate"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. It assumes the server is installed as monark. Review it before you use it.