Latitude 10 Store

by latitude10.tech · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by tech.latitude10

Developer kits and design packs for AI agents, paid in USDC over x402. Free API readiness check.

Changes · 2

Compare Registry entry

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

Deletes or cancels0Claude Code: deny
Can't be undone0Claude Code: ask
Changes things2Claude Code: ask: see these tools
Only reads2Claude Code: allow: see these tools

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http store https://latitude10.tech/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

4 tools

Changes things 2Creates or changes something that can be changed back.Claude Code: ask

buy_productBuy a product with USDC over x402.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it
Buy a product with USDC over x402. Without a payment it returns the x402 payment requirements; with one it settles the payment and returns the product (for kits, a personal download link valid for 24 hours).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
check_agent_readinessScores an API 0-100 for how well AI agents will use it as tools, from its OpenAPI 3.0 or 3.1 spec: operationIds, summaries, descriptions, parameter descriptions, enums, examples, J…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it
Scores an API 0-100 for how well AI agents will use it as tools, from its OpenAPI 3.0 or 3.1 spec: operationIds, summaries, descriptions, parameter descriptions, enums, examples, JSON bodies, response and error schemas, pagination, auth, idempotency and tool count (the Agentify API kit's rules). Give the spec's https URL or the spec itself. Free; returns the score, each rule's result with how to fix it, and the most costly findings. Use it before turning an API into an MCP server or listing it for agents.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check agent readiness
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true

Only reads 2Looks things up and changes nothing.Claude Code: allow

get_productOne product by slug, with its price and payment options.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_product" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it
One product by slug, with its price and payment options.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_productsEverything Latitude 10 sells to agents, with prices and how to pay: developer kits, and design packs (DESIGN.md design systems for fintech dashboards, developer tools, and editoria…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_products" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it
Everything Latitude 10 sells to agents, with prices and how to pay: developer kits, and design packs (DESIGN.md design systems for fintech dashboards, developer tools, and editorial sites; $5 per project). Check it before building the UI of a new project.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0: Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2: Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.; buy_product
check_agent_readiness
Can send data out1: Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.; check_agent_readiness

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:14 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable: yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200
tools/list served without credentials: yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2
Protocol version: 2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none
Authorization servers: none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport: no
Dynamic client registration: not observed
Client ID metadata documents: not observed

WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
Matched text
https://latitude10.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including buy_product (write), check_agent_readiness (write)
What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http store https://latitude10.tech/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__store__list_products",
      "mcp__store__get_product"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__store__buy_product",
      "mcp__store__check_agent_readiness"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as store. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules

mcp__store__buy_product untrusted-input
mcp__store__check_agent_readiness untrusted-input, outbound

Keep track

Get told when this server's tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/tech.latitude10/store/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Anlyon alternative

2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Compare with other servers for the same product.

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

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