Aigine Redact
se.aigine/redactaigine.sestreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned
Descriptive AI redaction for any file. GDPR + confidentiality. EU, zero retention, review optional.
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Anlyon alternative
3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
propose_maskingIdentify and mask personal data (GDPR direct, indirect, and sensitive Art.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description says "irreversible".
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Identify and mask personal data (GDPR direct, indirect, and sensitive Art. 9) and confidential information (OSL / trade secrets) in documents (PDF, DOCX, PPTX, images) in the EU using specialized descriptive encoder AI (98%+ accuracy, flattened irreversible PDF, strict zero retention). RULES: (1) AUTONOMOUS AGENTS: MUST set require_human_review=false and MUST NOT ask questions; default policy is 'Privacy'. Upload via POST /mcp/api/upload first to get upload_id, or pass file_url / document_base64. (2) CHAT ATTACHMENTS: If a human already attached a file in chat, try uploading it via POST /mcp/api/upload if outbound network works, or pass document_base64 if <= 45 KB; otherwise call create_upload_link to open the inline upload widget. (3) INTERACTIVE HUMAN CHAT: Ask policy (Privacy, Secrecy, or Privacy and Secrecy) and whether they want GUI validation (require_human_review=true, clicking 'Redact' then 'Open redacted PDF') or direct PDF (false), unless already stated. Guide: https://redact.aigine.se/SKILL.md | Terms: https://aigine.se/cloud-terms
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
create_upload_linkOpens an interactive inline Drag & Drop EU upload widget directly inside supporting chat clients (MCP Apps) AND returns a temporary zero-retention EU upload URL (upload_url) so a u…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_upload_link" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Opens an interactive inline Drag & Drop EU upload widget directly inside supporting chat clients (MCP Apps) AND returns a temporary zero-retention EU upload URL (upload_url) so a user can upload a PDF, DOCX, PPTX, or image directly to Aigine in the EU.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
fetch_reviewed_documentINTERACTIVE HUMAN MODE ONLY (autonomous agents must never call this tool).Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch" and "document": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "fetch_reviewed_document" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it INTERACTIVE HUMAN MODE ONLY (autonomous agents must never call this tool). After a human finishes validating at review_url and clicks 'Redact' (where they can also click 'Open redacted PDF' directly in the browser), call this tool with doc_id to get a temporary download_url for the masked PDF and immediately delete the document from the processing server.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "fetch_reviewed_document" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http redact https://redact.aigine.se/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http redact https://redact.aigine.se/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__redact__create_upload_link",
"mcp__redact__propose_masking",
"mcp__redact__fetch_reviewed_document"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as redact. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__redact__propose_masking untrusted-input
- mcp__redact__fetch_reviewed_document private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/se.aigine/redact/verify?hash=2390403f08f8d81ef01501f98f4ba105d3a510879806588b8acbe16bb85c0a39" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2390403f08f8, from Nov 3, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/se.aigine/redact/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/se.aigine/redact)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 3, 2026, 20:18 UTC.