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aft.page

page.aft/mcpaft.pagestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Deploy HTML or dist/ to a live HTTPS URL. No account. Drop, MCP, or CLI.

6 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →
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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • aft_rollbackPoint the live slug at a prior version from aft_deploys, by version number or deploy_id.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Point the live slug at a prior version from aft_deploys, by version number or deploy_id. Same URL. Needs edit_token from .aft/state.json. Claim not required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • deployPublish to a live URL.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deploy" says "deploy": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Publish to a live URL. Pass html (one page) OR files (a built site, or a small app's source). Plain HTML → html. Vite/React → npm run build, then files from dist/. Next static export → files from out/; a static site needs index.html. Flask/FastAPI/Django/Express → the source files with requirements.txt or package.json; aft builds and runs it. Never upload node_modules, .venv, or .next/. First hit: preferred_slug from aft.json (include aft.json in files). Later: same slug + edit_token from .aft/state.json — every update is a new version (v1, v2…) at the same URL. Pass hold:true to keep an update as a preview until aft_promote. label names the version. Limits: 500 files, 25MB each, 100MB total.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • aft_deploysList the versions (v1, v2…) of a slug with their label, door, commit and whether each is live or a held preview.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "aft_deploys" says "deploy": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "aft_deploys" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "aft_deploys" says "deploy": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the versions (v1, v2…) of a slug with their label, door, commit and whether each is live or a held preview. Needs edit_token from .aft/state.json (or the first deploy). Same history the project UI shows after claim.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • aft_promoteMake a held preview version live at the same URL.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Make a held preview version live at the same URL. Pass version (e.g. 4) or deploy_id from aft_deploys. Needs edit_token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • deploy_repoSame engine as aft.page/run: public GitHub URL → detect → build → live URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deploy_repo" says "deploy": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Same engine as aft.page/run: public GitHub URL → detect → build → live URL. Static is instant; Vite and Next.js build in the background (polls until live or failed). Private repos are refused. For a local project dir, use hosted CLI aft deploy instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • aft_healthPing the aft.page deploy API.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "ping": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ping the aft.page deploy API.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:12 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.aft.page/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including aft_rollback (destructive), deploy (irreversible), deploy_repo (write), aft_deploys (write), aft_promote (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • Warnaft_deploys

    The server marks "aft_deploys" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "aft_deploys" says "deploy": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http aft https://mcp.aft.page/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http aft https://mcp.aft.page/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__aft__aft_health"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__aft__deploy",
      "mcp__aft__deploy_repo",
      "mcp__aft__aft_deploys",
      "mcp__aft__aft_promote"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__aft__aft_rollback"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as aft. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__aft__deploy untrusted-input
  • mcp__aft__deploy_repo untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__aft__aft_rollback untrusted-input
  • mcp__aft__aft_promote untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/page.aft/mcp/verify?hash=697b312467c8e20b9ae739bc340ea22d96a4d0d180b7e78302d1adcb446fd6df" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 697b312467c8, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:15 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/page.aft/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

anlyon.dev badge for page.aft/mcp
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/page.aft/mcp.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/page.aft/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.