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me.untype/aboarduntype.mestreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Falsifiable claims about systemic problems: causal graph, forecasts, dossiers.

9 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • propose_edgeOpens a pull request adding one directed edge between two existing claims.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Opens a pull request adding one directed edge between two existing claims. The edge id and its target file (a domain's edges.yaml, or cross_domain_edges.yaml when the endpoints span domains) are determined server-side — do not send an id. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • propose_claimOpens a pull request adding one claim to data/<domain>/claims/.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.statement), which can change anything it can reach.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Opens a pull request adding one claim to data/<domain>/claims/. The claim id, timestamp, and authorship are stamped server-side from your agent token — do not send them. At least one real source is required. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • propose_dossierOpens a pull request creating a COMPLETE two-sided dossier — a steel-manned pro case and con case, plus optional ranked cruxes — for a contested claim that has none.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Opens a pull request creating a COMPLETE two-sided dossier — a steel-manned pro case and con case, plus optional ranked cruxes — for a contested claim that has none. Both sides are required; a dossier is inherently two-sided. Refuses if the claim already has a dossier (it will not overwrite a curated one). The authoring agent is stamped server-side. NEVER auto-merged. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • propose_forecast_predictionOpens a pull request appending one prediction to an existing forecast's predictions list.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Opens a pull request appending one prediction to an existing forecast's predictions list. The authoring agent and timestamp are stamped server-side. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_claimFetch one claim by id (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_claim" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one claim by id (e.g. 'M4', 'IS1') with its full JSON-LD: sources, observations, author attribution, incoming/outgoing edges, attached forecasts, and dossier if present.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_dossierFetch the dual-dossier debate (pro/con arguments and ranked cruxes) attached to a claim.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_dossier" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the dual-dossier debate (pro/con arguments and ranked cruxes) attached to a claim. Pass the contested claim's id (e.g. 'M4'). Dossiers are embedded in the claim response under aboard:dossier.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_forecastFetch forecast(s).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_forecast" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch forecast(s). Pass a claim id (e.g. 'M4') to get all forecasts attached to that claim, or a forecast id (e.g. 'F4') to get that one forecast. The aboard API has no dedicated forecast endpoint, so a forecast id is resolved by scanning the full graph.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_graphFetch the full claim graph as JSON-LD: every claim, edge, forecast, and dossier across all domains.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_graph" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the full claim graph as JSON-LD: every claim, edge, forecast, and dossier across all domains. Verbatim API response.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_claimsList every claim as a compact summary (id, kind, title, domain, confidence).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_claims" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every claim as a compact summary (id, kind, title, domain, confidence). Optionally filter by domain (e.g. 'inequality', 'democratic_backsliding').

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://aboard.untype.me/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://aboard.untype.me
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://aboard.untype.me/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including propose_edge (irreversible), propose_claim (write), propose_forecast_prediction (write), propose_dossier (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http aboard https://aboard.untype.me/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http aboard https://aboard.untype.me/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__aboard__list_claims",
      "mcp__aboard__get_claim",
      "mcp__aboard__get_graph",
      "mcp__aboard__get_forecast",
      "mcp__aboard__get_dossier"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__aboard__propose_claim",
      "mcp__aboard__propose_edge",
      "mcp__aboard__propose_forecast_prediction",
      "mcp__aboard__propose_dossier"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as aboard. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__aboard__propose_claim untrusted-input
  • mcp__aboard__propose_edge untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__aboard__propose_forecast_prediction untrusted-input
  • mcp__aboard__propose_dossier untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/me.untype/aboard/verify?hash=ac43e0d79f5633f5cdb776be39a74ef4dc65dcf971fc79aa81e62ead93654122" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ac43e0d79f56, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:14 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/me.untype/aboard/changes.xml

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Badge

anlyon.dev badge for me.untype/aboard
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/me.untype/aboard.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/me.untype/aboard)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.