Skip to content

CompatLab

by siddiksawani · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by GitHub user siddiksawani

Read recorded npm loading evidence across pinned Node.js, Bun and Deno runtimes.

Read only
CompareRegistry entry

2 tools: 2 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http compatlab https://compatlab.me/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

2 tools

Only reads 2Claude Code: allow
  • check_packageResolve an exact npm package version (latest when omitted) and read eligible loading evidence across pinned Node.js, Bun and Deno.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an exact npm package version (latest when omitted) and read eligible loading evidence across pinned Node.js, Bun and Deno. Never starts a scan. Missing evidence is not failure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_reportRead a retained report by UUID with runtime pins, coverage, failures, optional peers and current eligibility.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_report" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a retained report by UUID with runtime pins, coverage, failures, optional peers and current eligibility. Historical reports remain readable. Never starts a scan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:05 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http compatlab https://compatlab.me/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__compatlab__check_package",
      "mcp__compatlab__get_report"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as compatlab. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__compatlab__check_package untrusted-input
  • mcp__compatlab__get_report untrusted-input