BaseGuard AI
io.github.phalanejay-alt/baseguardphalanejay-altstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Deterministic Base contract intelligence over x402. Paid tools return USDC payment instructions.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
base_preflightPaid x402 service.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid x402 service. Deterministic structured report about a Base contract address: bytecode, verification status, proxy implementation, ownership and administrator control, minting, pause, blacklist and freeze capabilities, upgrade paths, token identity and supply, measured liquidity, privilege concentration, evidence sources, block number, timestamp, confidence and limitations.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
base_risk_deltaPaid x402 service.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid x402 service. Compares the previous persisted snapshot of a Base contract against a fresh observation and reports ownership, proxy implementation, admin, role holder, permission, supply, verification and liquidity changes, plus the contract events in between, each with severity and evidence.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
base_previewFree.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "base_preview" says "preview": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Returns a small real sample for an address: bytecode size and hash, block number, verification status and proxy status. Use it to confirm connectivity before paying for a full report.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
baseguard_statusFree.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "baseguard_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Service health, payment mode, supported networks, prices and Bazaar indexing status.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http baseguard https://work-1-bcozevpyudcxmqdj.prod-runtime.all-hands.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http baseguard https://work-1-bcozevpyudcxmqdj.prod-runtime.all-hands.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__baseguard__base_preview",
"mcp__baseguard__baseguard_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__baseguard__base_preflight",
"mcp__baseguard__base_risk_delta"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as baseguard. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__baseguard__base_preflight untrusted-input
- mcp__baseguard__base_risk_delta untrusted-input
- mcp__baseguard__base_preview untrusted-input
- mcp__baseguard__baseguard_status untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.phalanejay-alt/baseguard/verify?hash=ca3de6a0d6f9eab0a11a4b41122262e7f88bc75558ff228ab995326e14fba2bc" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ca3de6a0d6f9, from Nov 2, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.phalanejay-alt/baseguard/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.phalanejay-alt/baseguard)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 2, 2026, 16:18 UTC.