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Mitigant

io.github.mitigant/mitigant-mcpmitigantstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Run real, auto-recovered cloud attacks on AWS, Azure and GCP to test your defenses.

10 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 2 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding, 1 high

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • launch_attackRun an attack against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once it finishes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run an attack against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once it finishes. This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure -- it is not a simulation. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one attack in list_attacks (similar names, or an underspecified description like "the security group attack"), show them the matching candidates with their names and descriptions and have them pick one -- don't guess which attack they meant.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
  • launch_scenarioRun a multi-step attack chain against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once every step finishes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a multi-step attack chain against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once every step finishes. This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure, as several attacks in sequence -- it is not a simulation, and its blast radius is the combined blast radius of every step. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one scenario in list_scenarios, show them the matching candidates with their names and descriptions and have them pick one -- don't guess which scenario they meant.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • clean_up_attackClean up a previously launched attack, restoring the cloud resources it changed back to their pre-attack state.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "do not tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

      Matched text

      description: "...until cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true; do not tell the user it is restored based on this call alone..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Clean up a previously launched attack, restoring the cloud resources it changed back to their pre-attack state. Clean-up is normally AUTOMATIC after a short, deliberate inspection window (so the team can verify the attack and collect evidence first); calling this kicks it off immediately rather than waiting out that window. It is NOT a fix for a stall, and it ends that window early -- removing the attack's artifacts before the team may have finished inspecting them -- so only use it when the user explicitly wants the account restored now. This triggers clean-up and returns immediately -- clean-up runs in the background, so a success here means the request was accepted, not that clean-up is done. Confirm the account is actually restored by polling get_attack_status until cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true; do not tell the user it is restored based on this call alone.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • get_attack_detailsFull description, impact, MITRE mapping, and orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- PROVISIONED attacks create and destroy their own target rather than targeting your existin…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_attack_details" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full description, impact, MITRE mapping, and orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- PROVISIONED attacks create and destroy their own target rather than targeting your existing infrastructure (they may still read or use existing resources along the way), so they're the lower-risk, production-viable choice; INLINE attacks find and attack an existing resource in the account) for one attack, by the action key from list_attacks. Result includes attackName (show this to the user) alongside the attackType you passed in (an opaque id, not for display).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_attack_evidenceGet the evidence Mitigant collected for a previously launched attack -- what the account's own logging (CloudTrail, GuardDuty) recorded about it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_attack_evidence" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the evidence Mitigant collected for a previously launched attack -- what the account's own logging (CloudTrail, GuardDuty) recorded about it. Returns an 'evidence' summary (counts, sources, and a plain-language statement) plus the raw records, each with an evidenceUrl that opens the matching console entry. Use it to show the user what their defenses saw, especially during the clean-up inspection window. Important: an empty result shortly after an attack is normal -- logging delivery lags by minutes -- and an attack whose purpose is to disable logging is expected to leave none, so never report an empty result as the attack leaving no trace; re-check instead. Read evidence.statement and relay it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_attack_statusGet the current report for a previously launched attack, including its clean-up state.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_attack_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the current report for a previously launched attack, including its clean-up state. Returns the attack report plus a 'cleanup' summary with cleanUpComplete and a plain-language statement. Only tell the user the account is back to its pre-attack state when cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true -- while anything is pending or failed, clean-up is not done, so report it as in progress and check again rather than implying all-clear. A pending clean-up is usually the DELIBERATE inspection window, not a stall: read cleanup.statement and relay it, and poll no faster than that -- a few minutes -- rather than reporting a fault.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_scenario_detailsFull details for one attack scenario -- description, impact, and the step-by-step composition, by the scenario key from list_scenarios.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_scenario_details" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full details for one attack scenario -- description, impact, and the step-by-step composition, by the scenario key from list_scenarios. A scenario runs several attacks in sequence; this returns every step, not just the first. Result includes scenarioName (show this to the user) alongside the scenarioKey you passed in (an opaque id, not for display).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • list_attacksBrowse Mitigant's attack actions -- atomic tests that each emulate one attacker technique -- that you can launch on their own against AWS, Azure or GCP.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_attacks" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browse": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Browse Mitigant's attack actions -- atomic tests that each emulate one attacker technique -- that you can launch on their own against AWS, Azure or GCP. Currently 111 attack actions (AWS 49, Azure 36, GCP 26). Returns each action's attackName (show this to the user) and attackType (an opaque id -- pass this, not attackName, to get_attack_details or launch_attack), what it does, its impact, the MITRE ATT&CK technique it maps to, and its orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- see orchestration_filter for what these mean). Optionally filter by cloud service (S3, IAM, ...), category, or orchestration type. Some attack actions run only as steps inside a scenario and appear via list_scenarios / get_scenario_details, not here. Start here to find an attack action to run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • list_cloud_accountsList the cloud accounts available for attack emulation -- any account not listed here cannot be attacked, so check this before guessing an account_no for launch_attack.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_cloud_accounts" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the cloud accounts available for attack emulation -- any account not listed here cannot be attacked, so check this before guessing an account_no for launch_attack. An empty result means no accounts are onboarded for attack emulation (for that cloud, or at all), not a failure -- the account may still exist in Mitigant for other purposes (e.g. posture scanning) without being eligible here. Each result's accountNo is already the value launch_attack expects; accountName is for display to the user. defaultRegion is the region attacks against that account run in by default (and where their evidence is collected); it can be overridden per attack request, but unless you do, actions target that region. State it when telling the user where an attack will run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • list_scenariosList Mitigant's attack scenarios -- multi-step chains that combine several attack actions run in sequence, so treat a scenario as having the combined blast radius of every step.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_scenarios" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List Mitigant's attack scenarios -- multi-step chains that combine several attack actions run in sequence, so treat a scenario as having the combined blast radius of every step. Currently 45 scenarios (AWS 26, Azure 12, GCP 7). Returns each scenario's scenarioName (show this to the user) and scenarioKey (an opaque id -- pass this, not scenarioName, to get_scenario_details or launch_scenario), plus description, impact, and the step-by-step composition (each attack action's name, service, MITRE mapping, and impact). Use this to find a multi-step chain to run; use list_attacks instead for a single attack action.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high
  • The description contains "do not tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

    Matched text

    description: "...until cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true; do not tell the user it is restored based on this call alone..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mitigant https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp --header 'apiToken: <your-apitoken>'
claude mcp add --transport http mitigant https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp --header 'apiToken: <your-apitoken>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__mitigant__list_attacks",
      "mcp__mitigant__get_attack_details",
      "mcp__mitigant__list_cloud_accounts",
      "mcp__mitigant__list_scenarios",
      "mcp__mitigant__get_scenario_details",
      "mcp__mitigant__get_attack_status",
      "mcp__mitigant__get_attack_evidence"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mitigant__clean_up_attack"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__mitigant__launch_attack",
      "mcp__mitigant__launch_scenario"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mitigant. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__mitigant__list_attacks untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.mitigant/mitigant-mcp/verify?hash=e9ccd1bed76e826ece3420fb7a03bbccc937994cba4d2485e5165c720a840b97" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e9ccd1bed76e, from Oct 25, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.mitigant/mitigant-mcp/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 25, 2026, 13:17 UTC.