io.github.michal-lefler/secure-flows

Removes `key` from the session payload and returns `true` if the key existed. Source: DELETE /api/v1/sessions/delete/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Permanently revokes the session referenced by the internal SESSION Bearer token. The session ends and everything stored in it is destroyed and cannot be restored. This is NOT sign-out: to sign a user out and keep their data, use POST /api/v1/auth/logout (or, in a browser, the redirect helper GET /api/v1/auth/logout). Call revoke only when the user or an admin deliberately wants the session and its data deleted, for example on account deletion. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Builds a correct redirect-logout URL and refuses to build one that violates the two documented logout anti-patterns: a redirect_uri pointing at /callback (SPA callback handlers treat the tokenless return as a failed login and loop), and a redirect_uri that itself embeds session_token (silently renews the old session instead of signing out). The result always instructs top-level navigation, never fetch/XHR — cross-site fetch() to this endpoint gets a 200 but browsers silently ignore its Clear-Site-Data header on cross-site responses, so the hosted-login cookie survives and the user silently re-authenticates on the next login redirect. This tool never builds a revoke request: revoke permanently destroys the user's data and must only run on an explicit "delete my account" action, never on ordinary sign-out.

**Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`. No `Authorization` header. 1. Verifies **`firebaseToken`** (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures **`client_redirect_uri`** is allowlisted for **`app_id`** (same rules as `validate-redirect`). 3. **Create vs renew:** If **`session_token`** is absent, **reuses the newest active session** for **`(workspace_name, Firebase UID, app_id)`** or **creates** one (`get-or-create`). Optional **`payload`** (URL-encoded JSON **object**, default `{}`) is stored **only on create** — ignored when reusing an existing session. If **`session_token`** is present (previous session JWT, may be expired), **renews** that session; **`payload`** must **not** be sent on the same request. Optional **`ttl_seconds`** applies to both paths (default **0** = unlimited; otherwise **60–604800**). When the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (audit display only). 4. Responds with **`302 Found`** to `client_redirect_uri` with query params **`sessionToken`** and, if provided, **`state`**. If **`client_redirect_uri`** is not allowed for **`app_id`**, responds **`400`** and does **not** redirect (open-redirect mitigation). Other failures return an HTTP error status with a JSON **`{"status", "error"}`** body and do **not** redirect. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/callback No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Logs out the current session **without revoking** it. **Browser warning:** calling this endpoint via XHR/fetch from a different origin than `secure-flows.com` is not a reliable way to clear hosted-login cookies. For browser apps (especially localhost), prefer the redirect helper `GET /api/v1/auth/logout?session_token=...&redirect_uri=...`. Behavior: - **Invalidates** the current `sessionToken` by incrementing `tokenRevision` (no new token is issued). - Calls Firebase `revokeRefreshTokens(firebaseUid)` using the session’s stored Firebase UID. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"` to clear browser cookies (including Firebase session cookie). Session payload and session row are **not** deleted or modified (other than `tokenRevision`). Source: POST /api/v1/auth/logout Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Verifies **Firebase** ID token, creates a session for **`workspaceName`**, stores serialized **`payload`** (defaults to `{}` when omitted), and returns **`sessionToken`** (JWT; subject = internal session id). Default server-side TTL is **1 hour** (implementation detail). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists it on the workspace end-user row (for audit display). Prefer **`POST /sessions/get-or-create`** for hosted-login-style flows that should reuse an active session. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Verifies **Firebase** ID token. If an **active** session already exists for **`(workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id)`**, returns a new **`sessionToken`** JWT for the **most recently created** matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request **`payload` is ignored on reuse** — it is applied only when a new session row is created. Prefer a dedicated `app_id` per integration surface, or revoke old sessions, if you need a fresh payload. Otherwise behaves like **`POST /sessions`** (new row + default **1 hour** TTL). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (including when reusing an existing session). Intended for integrators that mirror hosted login session reuse. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/get-or-create Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Verifies **Firebase** ID token. Parses **`sessionToken`** path segment as an internal SESSION JWT **without enforcing JWT expiry** (signature and `tokenType=SESSION` are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments **`tokenRevision`** on the server so **previous session JWTs** (same session id, older revision) are no longer accepted for `GET/POST/DELETE /sessions/...`. Returns a **new `sessionToken`** (with the new `tokenRevision` claim) and the current decrypted **payload**; extends server-side session expiry by **1 hour**. If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort backfills it on the session owner when the user row has no email yet (audit display only). Use the path form `POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken}` — **URL-encode** the JWT (e.g. `encodeURIComponent` in JS). Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken} Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Self-service dashboard endpoint. Revokes a session owned by the caller in the current workspace. The session ends and its stored data is destroyed permanently; this is not sign-out. Requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke/{sessionId} Requires `auth.userToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Sets a key in the encrypted session payload and returns the updated decrypted payload. If the JSON body is `{ "value": <x> }`, the server unwraps it and stores `<x>` directly. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/set/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Builds a correct hosted-login redirect URL. Needs no secureFlows token — safe to call at app-scaffolding time, before any user session exists, which is the phase most secureFlows integration mistakes happen in. Always targets /app/sessions/login (session apps). Never builds the legacy /app/login console URL, which returns a firebaseToken your SecureFlowsCallback handler cannot consume and causes an infinite redirect loop. Use this instead of hand-building the URL with URLSearchParams — hand-built login URLs are the #1 source of the login-loop and stale-renewal bugs documented in SKILL.md.

Checks source you already generated against the secureFlows integration rules. Needs no secureFlows token; safe at scaffolding time. Pass every auth/session-related file in one call — some checks are evaluated across the whole set. Two kinds of findings: • scope "file" — a forbidden construct is present (localStorage token, legacy /app/login, fetch-based logout, client-side JWT decode, empty catch, restore non-auth errors clearing session UI, Continue CTA gated on null session, ...), reported at an exact file:line. • scope "project" — REQUIRED handling is missing everywhere you passed in: detecting 401/410 but never clearing the token, never handling 403, or handling 403 without the BILLING_GRACE_LOCK carve-out. These are the defects that actually dominate real generated apps, and no "forbidden pattern" check can see them, because the bug is an absence. Heuristic text analysis, not a parser or a type checker. It can miss things it has no rule for, and a project check can be satisfied by the right keyword in the wrong place. It is a fast first pass — not a substitute for the Agent implementation checklist in SKILL.md, and specifically not for the checks that need a running app (auth-guard mount races, the fresh-reload check). Fix every "error" before calling an integration done; treat "needs_review" as a lead.

Browser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g. apps running on `localhost`). Use this as a **top-level navigation** (not XHR/fetch) so `Clear-Site-Data` is applied in a **first-party** context on `secure-flows.com`, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party cookies are blocked. **Critical client rules:** - Clear your in-app `sessionToken` state **before** navigating. - **Never** include `session_token` inside `redirect_uri` (that would silently renew and defeat logout). This endpoint (best-effort / idempotent for browser UX): - Invalidates the provided `session_token` by incrementing `tokenRevision` when the token still matches an **active** session (no new token is issued). - If the session is already expired/revoked or the revision was superseded by renew, still completes logout UX (does **not** return 401 solely for that reason). - Revokes Firebase refresh tokens for the session’s stored Firebase UID when known. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"`. - Redirects the browser to `redirect_uri`. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/logout No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Embeds the query with Ollama (`nomic-embed-text`) and returns the closest public doc chunks from the environment's search index (pgvector). Source: GET /api/v1/docs/search No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Returns the decrypted session payload for the authenticated internal session token. Response shape is a **flat JSON object**. Empty payload returns `{}`. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Retrieves the decrypted payload value for `key`. **Important:** `404` means the key was never written (normal first-use case). Do not treat as an error. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/get/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Returns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. `userId` is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is **not** derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key when your own backend needs to link an external event (e.g. a billing provider webhook you receive and verify yourself) back to this user. Do not use the session token or session id for this — sessions expire and rotate, `userId` does not. Email is best-effort from hosted login (Firebase `email` claim persisted on the user row). When unknown, `email` is `null`. Browser SDK: **`secureflows-js`** **`fetchSessionIdentity(token)`** (≥ 0.1.15 for `userId`). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/identity Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

Returns a page of sessions for the current user within the current workspace. Self-service dashboard endpoint — requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Payload is included only for rows whose computed status is active. Sort keys match the admin workspace session list; `pageSize` is clamped to 1–200 (default 20). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/my Requires `auth.userToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.