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SanctionsAI

by kindrat86 · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.1.1 · published by GitHub user kindrat86

OFAC sanctions screening for AI agents: 1,050 wallets, 19,389 SDN names, <100ms. Free tier, no key.

Changes · 2
CompareRegistry entry

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http sanctionsai https://sanctionsai.dev/api/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • screen_nameScreen a person or entity name against OFAC SDN, EU consolidated, and UN sanctions lists.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a person or entity name against OFAC SDN, EU consolidated, and UN sanctions lists. Returns match status, confidence, and list source.
  • screen_walletScreen a cryptocurrency wallet address against OFAC SDN sanctions list.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a cryptocurrency wallet address against OFAC SDN sanctions list. Returns match status and any associated sanctioned entity.
Only reads 1Claude Code: allow
  • get_sanctions_listsList all supported sanctions lists with last-updated dates and entity counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_sanctions_lists" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all supported sanctions lists with last-updated dates and entity counts.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://sanctionsai.dev/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_name (write), screen_wallet (write)

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sanctionsai https://sanctionsai.dev/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sanctionsai__get_sanctions_lists"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sanctionsai__screen_name",
      "mcp__sanctionsai__screen_wallet"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sanctionsai. Review it before you use it.