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io.github.jyswee/gpusmarket

by jyswee · remote · local (npm) · no sign-in to list tools · v2.4.16 · published by GitHub user jyswee

Rent real GPUs from the terminal. Per-second billing, $0.50 minimum. stdio MCP server.

Deletes · 1
CompareRegistry entry

2 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport sse gpusmarket https://mcp.gpusmarket.com/sse

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

2 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • gpusmarket_signupCreate a new GPUsMarket account.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a new GPUsMarket account. Requires the human's email. Returns an API key (shown once) and unlocks all GPUsMarket tools in this session immediately. To rent, the human adds a card via secure Stripe checkout — nothing is charged to sign up. Ask the human for their email before calling.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Claude Code: allow
  • gpusmarket_get_startedExplains what GPUsMarket is and how to activate this MCP server (no API key on this session yet).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "gpusmarket_get_started" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Explains what GPUsMarket is and how to activate this MCP server (no API key on this session yet).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
202
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
yes
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 destructive). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.gpusmarket.com/sse: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including gpusmarket_signup (destructive)

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 2.4.16. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport sse gpusmarket https://mcp.gpusmarket.com/sse

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__gpusmarket__gpusmarket_get_started"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__gpusmarket__gpusmarket_signup"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gpusmarket. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__gpusmarket__gpusmarket_get_started untrusted-input
  • mcp__gpusmarket__gpusmarket_signup untrusted-input