webEmbedding

io.github.jongko54/web-embeddingjongko54streamable-httpv0.3.11Scanned 53 minutes ago

Clone any web page from a URL into a verified offline HTML copy, embed, or rebuild.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Reads private data · 0
Reads text others write · 2
Can send data out · 3
2 findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Creates or changes something that can be changed back.Claude Code: ask

classify_clone_modeDecide whether a reference should be embedded, sourced, locally captured, bounded-rebuilt, or blocked before reproduction.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it
Decide whether a reference should be embedded, sourced, locally captured, bounded-rebuilt, or blocked before reproduction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
detect_runtime_capabilitiesReport hosted Apps SDK readiness, read-only runtime capabilities, unsupported capture behavior, and the local stdio command.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it
Report hosted Apps SDK readiness, read-only runtime capabilities, unsupported capture behavior, and the local stdio command.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
discover_embed_candidatesExtract likely embed, preview, viewer, remix, and source URLs from a public or user-authorized page.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it
Extract likely embed, preview, viewer, remix, and source URLs from a public or user-authorized page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
generate_embed_snippetGenerate an iframe snippet for a known frameable and authorized URL.Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_embed_snippet" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
  The server marks "generate_embed_snippet" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
  Matched text
  annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_embed_snippet" says "generate": a word for a change.
  What this check looks for
Description, as the server wrote it
Generate an iframe snippet for a known frameable and authorized URL. Does not verify frameability by itself.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
plan_reproduction_pathCreate a source-first plan that separates exact embed/source reuse from local capture and bounded rebuild work.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
  The server marks "plan_reproduction_path" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
  Matched text
  annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
  What this check looks for
Description, as the server wrote it
Create a source-first plan that separates exact embed/source reuse from local capture and bounded rebuild work.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true

Only reads 1Looks things up and changes nothing.Show 1 read-only tool

inspect_urlFetch a public or user-authorized URL and inspect title, metadata, frame policy, and likely source/embed candidates.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "inspect_url" says "inspect": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "inspect_url" says "inspect" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it
Fetch a public or user-authorized URL and inspect title, metadata, frame policy, and likely source/embed candidates. Does not capture screenshots or persist artifacts.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0: Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2: Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.; discover_embed_candidates
inspect_url
Can send data out3: Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.; discover_embed_candidates
generate_embed_snippet
inspect_url

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable: yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402
tools/list served without credentials: no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0
Protocol version: not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: not observed
Authorization servers: not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport: no
Dynamic client registration: not observed
Client ID metadata documents: not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 402.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn

Warngenerate_embed_snippet
The server marks "generate_embed_snippet" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
Matched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_embed_snippet" says "generate": a word for a change.
What this check looks for
Warnplan_reproduction_path
The server marks "plan_reproduction_path" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
Matched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.11. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http web-embedding https://webembedding-jongkos-mcp.vercel.app/mcp

claude mcp add --transport http web-embedding https://webembedding-jongkos-mcp.vercel.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__web-embedding__detect_runtime_capabilities",
      "mcp__web-embedding__inspect_url",
      "mcp__web-embedding__discover_embed_candidates",
      "mcp__web-embedding__classify_clone_mode",
      "mcp__web-embedding__generate_embed_snippet",
      "mcp__web-embedding__plan_reproduction_path"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as web-embedding. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules

mcp__web-embedding__inspect_url untrusted-input, outbound
mcp__web-embedding__discover_embed_candidates untrusted-input, outbound
mcp__web-embedding__generate_embed_snippet outbound

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding/verify?hash=52d5f0a149b64dc7780d10e1b0263e5b103318f53ee6fb1a2df7284d6fd896e2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 52d5f0a149b6, from Oct 28, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding/changes.xml

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Badge

[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 12:17 UTC.