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io.github.iamalanlui/apipay

by iamalanlui · remote · local (npm) · no sign-in to list tools · v0.4.2 · published by GitHub user iamalanlui

Prepaid balance for AI agents: one key, 4,900+ tools your agent can run today, caps, receipts.

Deletes · 3Changes · 4

8 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 4 change things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

3 checks matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http apipay https://apifare.com/mcp

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn1 info
  • The server marks "get_vault_link" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_vault_link" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "another SERVER", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "Move a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conv..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...nsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side. Native request/re..."

    What this check looks for

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

8 tools

Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
  • secret_generateGenerate a random secret and place it directly at a vendor resource SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "secret_generate" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a random secret and place it directly at a vendor resource SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • secret_transferMove a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "secret_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Warn

      The description contains "another SERVER", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "Move a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conv..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Move a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation. Example: fetch a Supabase service_role key and place it as a Vercel env var.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • topupTop up the apifare balance from the owner's standing auto-refill mandate (if the owner enabled one).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "topup" says "topup": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Top up the apifare balance from the owner's standing auto-refill mandate (if the owner enabled one). Charges within the owner's configured limits and returns the new balance. Without a mandate, returns payment instructions to relay to the user.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • call_apiCall an API from the apifare catalog by slug (find slugs with search_apis).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_api" says "call": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call an API from the apifare catalog by slug (find slugs with search_apis). The cost in prepaid credits is deducted automatically and returned with the result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_balanceCheck the remaining apifare prepaid credit balance (1 credit = $0.01) and get the top-up link.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check the remaining apifare prepaid credit balance (1 credit = $0.01) and get the top-up link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • vendor_callCall a vendor MANAGEMENT API (supabase, vercel, fly, resend, github, npm, cloudflare, lemonsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vendor_call" says "call": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...nsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side. Native request/re..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call a vendor MANAGEMENT API (supabase, vercel, fly, resend, github, npm, cloudflare, lemonsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side. Native request/response; destructive, billing, and member/admin routes are blocked. The root token is never visible.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Claude Code: allow
  • search_apisSearch the apifare catalog of ready-to-call APIs (web search, scraping, weather, and more).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_apis" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the apifare catalog of ready-to-call APIs (web search, scraping, weather, and more). Returns each API's slug, params, and per-call price in prepaid credits. Every miss is logged so missing APIs get added.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http apipay https://apifare.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__apipay__search_apis"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__apipay__call_api",
      "mcp__apipay__get_vault_link",
      "mcp__apipay__check_balance",
      "mcp__apipay__vendor_call"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__apipay__topup",
      "mcp__apipay__secret_transfer",
      "mcp__apipay__secret_generate"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. It assumes the server is installed as apipay. Review it before you use it.