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GBG Loqate - Reach

by gbgplc · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v0.6.2 · published by GitHub user gbgplc

Verify addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers with confidence scores.

Changes · 8
CompareRegistry entry

11 tools: 8 change things and 3 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http lqt https://reach.prod.fabric.gbgplatforms.com/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

11 tools

Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • verify_addressVerify an address against Loqate's global reference data.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify an address against Loqate's global reference data. Returns a confidence score (0-1), verification status, and a policy-driven accept/review/reject recommendation. Set 'suggest' to also get alternative addresses suggested by Loqate whenever the address does not clear the policy; offer them to the user and verify the chosen one in a second call before treating it as good. Suggestions require a separately licensed Loqate feature enabled on the account — without it, verification still succeeds and the problem is reported in suggestions.error. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field (get one at account.loqate.com).

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Address
  • verify_address_batchVerify up to 100 addresses in one call.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify up to 100 addresses in one call. Up to 100 records per call; the results array is in submission order and each entry carries its input index, so results can be zipped back onto rows without relying on order. One bad record fails only itself — it carries an error while the rest are verified. Suggestions are not available in batch. Records are grouped by country before being sent, as Loqate recommends, so the cost is one upstream call per distinct country in the batch rather than one per call. Set detect_country to guess the country of records that do not supply one — detection runs per record, before grouping, so a mixed batch still sends each group with the right default. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Addresses (Batch)
  • verify_contactVerify address, email, and/or phone together.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify address, email, and/or phone together. Returns individual results plus an overall recommendation (most conservative of all provided fields). Set 'suggest' to also get alternative addresses suggested by Loqate whenever the address does not clear the policy; offer them to the user and verify the chosen one in a second call before treating it as good. Suggestions require a separately licensed Loqate feature enabled on the account — without it, verification still succeeds and the problem is reported in suggestions.error. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Contact
  • verify_contact_batchVerify up to 100 contacts in one call, each with any combination of address, email and phone, returning an overall recommendation per contact.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify up to 100 contacts in one call, each with any combination of address, email and phone, returning an overall recommendation per contact. Results are in submission order and each carries its input index. One bad record fails only itself, and a field that cannot be verified does not remove the contact — the overall recommendation is drawn from whichever fields were checked. The three types run concurrently, so a full batch is paced by email at roughly 7 seconds per 100. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Contacts (Batch)
  • verify_emailVerify an email address via Loqate.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify an email address via Loqate. Returns confidence, risk level, and accept/review/reject recommendation. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Email
  • verify_email_batchVerify up to 100 email addresses in one call.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify up to 100 email addresses in one call. Up to 100 records per call; the results array is in submission order and each entry carries its input index, so results can be zipped back onto rows without relying on order. One bad record fails only itself — it carries an error while the rest are verified. Suggestions are not available in batch. The batch endpoint returns less detail than single verification: risk, complainer and reason are absent, though the accept/review/reject recommendation and the disposable-mailbox flag are identical. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Emails (Batch)
  • verify_phoneVerify a phone number via Loqate.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a phone number via Loqate. Returns confidence, number type, carrier, and accept/review/reject recommendation. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Phone Number
  • verify_phone_batchVerify up to 100 phone numbers in one call.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phones): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify up to 100 phone numbers in one call. Up to 100 records per call; the results array is in submission order and each entry carries its input index, so results can be zipped back onto rows without relying on order. One bad record fails only itself — it carries an error while the rest are verified. Suggestions are not available in batch. Phone validation has no bulk endpoint, so numbers are checked concurrently against a shared limit. Measured at around 2.6s for 100 numbers, which is the fastest of the three batch types — email is the slowest, at roughly 7s for 100, because it probes mail servers. Requires a Loqate API key — pass it via the 'key' field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify Phone Numbers (Batch)
Only reads 3Claude Code: allow
  • list_policiesList available decisioning policies (strict, shipping, standard, permissive) with their thresholds.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_policies" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List available decisioning policies (strict, shipping, standard, permissive) with their thresholds.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: List Policies
  • retrieve_addressResolve a suggestion id from address.suggestions into its full cleansed address components (organisation, sub-building, number, street, city, province, postcode, country).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "retrieve_address" says "retrieve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve a suggestion id from address.suggestions into its full cleansed address components (organisation, sub-building, number, street, city, province, postcode, country). Use this when you need the address itself — to fill a form or show a confirmation — rather than a decision; to verify a chosen suggestion instead, pass 'suggestion_id' to verify_address. CONSUMES A LOQATE CREDIT per call, so resolve only the one suggestion the user chose. The result is reference data, NOT a verification. Requires a Loqate API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Retrieve Address Details
  • show_policyShow full details for a specific decisioning policy.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "show_policy" says "show": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show full details for a specific decisioning policy.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Show Policy

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write9
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:59 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://reach.prod.fabric.gbgplatforms.com/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_address (write), verify_address_batch (write), verify_contact (write), verify_contact_batch (write), verify_email (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 0.6.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http lqt https://reach.prod.fabric.gbgplatforms.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__lqt__list_policies",
      "mcp__lqt__retrieve_address",
      "mcp__lqt__show_policy"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__lqt__verify_address",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_address_batch",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_contact",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_contact_batch",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_email",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_email_batch",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_phone",
      "mcp__lqt__verify_phone_batch"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as lqt. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__lqt__retrieve_address untrusted-input
  • mcp__lqt__verify_address untrusted-input
  • mcp__lqt__verify_address_batch untrusted-input
  • mcp__lqt__verify_contact untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__lqt__verify_contact_batch untrusted-input
  • mcp__lqt__verify_email untrusted-input
  • mcp__lqt__verify_email_batch untrusted-input
  • mcp__lqt__verify_phone untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__lqt__verify_phone_batch untrusted-input, outbound