Store Canary
io.github.erikras/store-canaryerikrasstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Read-only health check for WooCommerce stores: HTTPS, WooCommerce, cart, checkout, payments.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Anlyon alternative
1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_storeCheck a public WooCommerce store from the outside: is it reachable, is HTTPS valid and are redirects sane, is WooCommerce detected, do /cart/ and /checkout/ load, and are payment m…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_store" says "store": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_store" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store" says "store": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a public WooCommerce store from the outside: is it reachable, is HTTPS valid and are redirects sane, is WooCommerce detected, do /cart/ and /checkout/ load, and are payment markers visible on checkout. Read-only: GET requests only, never adds to cart, logs in or submits forms. Returns pass/warn/fail findings plus a link to the full audit.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a WooCommerce store
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncheck_store
The server marks "check_store" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store" says "store": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http store-canary https://mcp.storecanary.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http store-canary https://mcp.storecanary.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__store-canary__check_store"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as store-canary. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__store-canary__check_store untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.erikras/store-canary/verify?hash=c675d2b052de2f892ca87d83c503570389d28b2afd55a400b9989d35e2e2a8bc" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c675d2b052de, from Oct 29, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.erikras/store-canary/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.erikras/store-canary)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 12:17 UTC.