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Repo Run Check

io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-checkdevx-agentstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Check GitHub repos and shell commands for malware-delivery tricks before an AI agent runs them

3 tools: 3 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →
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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_commandFree, offline.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, offline. Call BEFORE running a shell/PowerShell command copied from a README, issue, website or chat: flags download-and-execute, encoded PowerShell, LOLBins, disabling antivirus, known malware domains and pipe-to-shell from unknown hosts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_repoFree, read-only.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Call BEFORE following a GitHub repo's install/setup instructions or running its commands: scans the README for download-and-execute one-liners (iwr|iex, curl|sh from unknown hosts), obfuscated or base64 payloads, known malware domains, agent-targeted prompt injection, password-protected archives. Returns verdict dangerous | review_before_running | no_red_flags with line evidence. Paid full check (0.005 USDC via x402) adds package.json install scripts, typosquatted deps, install.sh/setup.py, .vscode autorun tasks and fake-star signals.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • full_report_infoHow to buy the full repo check via x402.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How to buy the full repo check via x402. Does not pay.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • Warncheck_command

    The server marks "check_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http repo-run-check https://repo-run-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http repo-run-check https://repo-run-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__repo-run-check__check_repo",
      "mcp__repo-run-check__check_command",
      "mcp__repo-run-check__full_report_info"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as repo-run-check. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__repo-run-check__check_repo untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check/verify?hash=3e20ca6f5f8a98791b587dea8d9a03a073c6604160a026a55a7ce716fdc68a3c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3e20ca6f5f8a, from Oct 30, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check/changes.xml

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Badge

anlyon.dev badge for io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 05:17 UTC.