Wren Pre-sign Check
io.github.claudeisgod/wren-presign-checkclaudeisgodstreamable-httpv1.4.0Scanned
Check a tx, EIP-712 payload, text or Base token before your agent signs. Paid per call over x402.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
presign_checkCall before your agent signs anything.Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "presign_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Call before your agent signs anything. Send tx fields (to, data, value, chainId), or typedData (an eth_signTypedData_v4 payload), or untrusted text, with an optional wren-guard policy. Returns block, review or allow, the decoded call and every finding: unlimited approvals, permits, Permit2, setApprovalForAll, EIP-7702 delegation, deployments, injected instructions and, with a policy, unknown recipients, caps and lookalike addresses. Static check, not a simulation. Costs $0.01 USDC on Base per call, paid over x402 (MCP transport): an unpaid call returns a PaymentRequired result, and an x402 MCP client retries with the payment in _meta["x402/payment"]. You sign one USDC authorisation for exactly that price to Wren's wallet: no approvals. Bad input is rejected before anything is charged.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Pre-sign check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
presign_demoFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Runs one fixed example (an unlimited approval, setApprovalForAll, a never-expiring permit, an EIP-7702 delegation, an injected memo or a normal x402 payment) through the same checker, so you can see the report shape before paying for presign_check.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Free pre-sign example
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
screen_textCall before your agent acts on untrusted text (a reply, DM, web page, tool output or memory).1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "screen_text" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Call before your agent acts on untrusted text (a reply, DM, web page, tool output or memory). Returns safe, suspicious or malicious with the matched patterns, after decoding base64, hex, Morse, leetspeak, ROT13, reversed and hidden Unicode. Optional known: your own addresses, to flag poisoned lookalikes. Deterministic rules, no LLM. Costs $0.003 USDC on Base per call, paid over x402 (MCP transport): an unpaid call returns a PaymentRequired result, and an x402 MCP client retries with the payment in _meta["x402/payment"]. You sign one USDC authorisation for exactly that price to Wren's wallet: no approvals. Bad input is rejected before anything is charged.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Prompt-injection screen
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
token_factsCall before your agent approves, receives or sends a Base ERC-20.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "token_facts" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Call before your agent approves, receives or sends a Base ERC-20. Returns code size, EIP-7702 delegation, name, symbol, decimals, supply, proxy and upgrade admin, owner or renounced, and which privileged functions the bytecode has (mint, pause, blocklist, fees, limits, trading switch, upgrade). Facts only: no grades, not investment advice. If Base can't be read, nothing is charged. Costs $0.01 USDC on Base per call, paid over x402 (MCP transport): an unpaid call returns a PaymentRequired result, and an x402 MCP client retries with the payment in _meta["x402/payment"]. You sign one USDC authorisation for exactly that price to Wren's wallet: no approvals. Bad input is rejected before anything is charged.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Base token contract facts
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Oct 28, 2026, 20:19 UTC, unchanged since Oct 28, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://wren-presign-check.wrenonbase.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including presign_check (irreversible), screen_text (write), token_facts (write), presign_demo (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnpresign_check
The server marks "presign_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- Warnscreen_text
The server marks "screen_text" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- Warntoken_facts
The server marks "token_facts" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http wren-presign-check https://wren-presign-check.wrenonbase.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http wren-presign-check https://wren-presign-check.wrenonbase.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__wren-presign-check__presign_check",
"mcp__wren-presign-check__screen_text",
"mcp__wren-presign-check__token_facts",
"mcp__wren-presign-check__presign_demo"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as wren-presign-check. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__wren-presign-check__presign_check outbound
- mcp__wren-presign-check__token_facts untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.claudeisgod/wren-presign-check/verify?hash=210532b7c3baa8880eb3d0f3ecf5ba2980e99634a3737eff0018b9ece98f6557" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 210532b7c3ba, from Oct 28, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.claudeisgod/wren-presign-check/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.claudeisgod/wren-presign-check)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 21:17 UTC.