Privi Anchor
io.github.canoydario847-cloud/privi-anchorcanoydario847-cloudstreamable-httpv0.4.2Scanned
Hash anchoring and proof-of-existence on chain for AI agents and apps. Free with an API key.
4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
anchor_hash_textSHA-256 of a piece of text, ready to pass to anchor_hashes.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it SHA-256 of a piece of text, ready to pass to anchor_hashes. Hashing happens here; nothing is stored.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
anchor_hashesAnchor up to 100 hashes on chain (Base until the Privi chain mainnet) in one transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Anchor up to 100 hashes on chain (Base until the Privi chain mainnet) in one transaction. Returns, for each hash, a receipt (tx_hash, Merkle proof, block, time) that anyone can check with anchor_verify. Requires an API key (Authorization: Bearer).
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
anchor_verifyCheck on the blockchain that a hash was anchored, by whom and when.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check on the blockchain that a hash was anchored, by whom and when. Free. With tx_hash and proof from a receipt, the check uses only chain data.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
anchor_statusWhich chain anchors go to, the service wallet that signs them, its gas balance, and totals.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "anchor_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Which chain anchors go to, the service wallet that signs them, its gas balance, and totals.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:57 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 404
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http privi-anchor https://privi-anchor.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http privi-anchor https://privi-anchor.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_hash_text",
"mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_verify",
"mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_hashes"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as privi-anchor. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_status untrusted-input
- mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_verify untrusted-input
- mcp__privi-anchor__anchor_hashes untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.canoydario847-cloud/privi-anchor/verify?hash=fd23865211c01b7ff799db0e45d576398f8b90542cf92bf820b97526d658a7b8" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash fd23865211c0, from Oct 26, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.canoydario847-cloud/privi-anchor/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.canoydario847-cloud/privi-anchor)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 20:18 UTC.