Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer

by aiguardrail · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.5 · published by GitHub user aiguardrail

Deterministic pre-trade risk checks for AI agents on Robinhood Chain. Returns allow/warn/deny.

Changes · 5

Compare Registry entry

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

Deletes or cancels0Claude Code: deny
Can't be undone0Claude Code: ask
Changes things5Claude Code: ask: see these tools
Only reads1Claude Code: allow: see these tools

3 checks matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http backend https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn1 info

Warnevaluate_trade
The server marks "evaluate_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
Matched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
What this check looks for
Warnevaluate_trade_paid
The server marks "evaluate_trade_paid" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
Matched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade_paid" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
What this check looks for
Infoevaluate_trade_paid
The description mentions "credential".
Matched text
description: "...required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_pro..."
What this check looks for

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

6 tools

Changes things 5Creates or changes something that can be changed back.Claude Code: ask

check_token_safetyHoneypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it
Honeypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token. Returns a severity classification (safe / warn / danger), the specific risk factors detected, and the result of a simulated sell. When severity=danger, the next `evaluate_trade` for the same contract is automatically denied regardless of any other checks. This is a heuristic bytecode + simulation check, not a formal audit. Use it before trading unknown tokens, memecoins, or any contract that is absent from the official Robinhood Chain registry. It is safe to call repeatedly; no transaction is ever sent.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check Token Safety
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
evaluate_tradePre-trade risk check for a proposed trade.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
  The server marks "evaluate_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
  Matched text
  annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
  What this check looks for
Description, as the server wrote it
Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade. Call this BEFORE executing any trade and treat a "deny" decision as a hard stop. Evaluated at a fixed Tier 1 ceiling ($5,000 notional). For higher limits, use `evaluate_trade_paid` (Tier 2, $25,000) which settles an x402 payment on-chain.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate Trade (Free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
evaluate_trade_paidPre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "evaluate_trade_paid" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
  The description mentions "credential".
  Matched text
  description: "...required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_pro..."
  What this check looks for
- Warn
  The server marks "evaluate_trade_paid" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
  Matched text
  annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade_paid" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
  What this check looks for
Description, as the server wrote it
Pre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment. Evaluated as COLR Tier 2: $25,000 notional ceiling, 10/25 per-minute rate limits. No COLR holdings are required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_proof → the tool returns a `PaymentRequiredOutput` describing the on-chain payment (network, asset, amount, payTo, resource). 2. Settle the payment on-chain using an x402-capable client. The facilitator returns a proof string. 3. Call again with `payment_proof=<proof>` → the tool forwards the proof to the guardrail's x402-paid endpoint and returns a full `EvaluateTradeOutput` with `tier=2`.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Evaluate Trade (x402 Paid, Tier 2)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
simulate_balanceSimulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it
Simulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override. Read-only: no transaction is ever sent.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Simulate Balance
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_audit_trailVerify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it
Verify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify Audit Trail
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false

Only reads 1Looks things up and changes nothing.Claude Code: allow

get_supported_assetsList every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_supported_assets" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it
List every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Supported Assets
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http backend https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__backend__get_supported_assets"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__backend__evaluate_trade",
      "mcp__backend__evaluate_trade_paid",
      "mcp__backend__check_token_safety",
      "mcp__backend__simulate_balance",
      "mcp__backend__verify_audit_trail"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. It assumes the server is installed as backend. Review it before you use it.

Keep track

Get told when this server's tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.aiguardrail/backend/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.

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