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io.github.ZlaylowZ/nukez-mcp

by ZlaylowZ · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.3.0 · published by GitHub user ZlaylowZ

Agent-native storage with cryptographic verification on Solana. Keyless: clients sign and pay.

Deletes · 1Final · 1Changes · 10

15 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 10 change things and 3 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

1 check matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http nukez https://mcp.nukez.xyz/mcp

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description is 2,325 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...t and re-call with envelope=<signed result>. One file per call in envelope mode."

    What this check looks for

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

15 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • nukez_deleteDelete files from your Nukez locker.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_delete" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The description says "irreversible".
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete files from your Nukez locker. WARNING: permanent and irreversible. Invalidates existing attestation. KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: a call without `envelope` returns action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact delete spec to sign (locker:write, bound to one file's path); sign it with your wallet and re-call with filenames=[that file] plus envelope=<signed result>. One file per call in envelope mode.
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • nukez_payStep 2: Record an externally-executed on-chain payment.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_pay" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2: Record an externally-executed on-chain payment. The server is keyless and never signs transactions — execute the transfer yourself (Solana sendTransaction or an EVM client) and pass the resulting signature as tx_sig. Uses pay_req_id from nukez_quote (auto-resolved from state). Specify chain and pay_asset to identify the rail (e.g. chain='solana-mainnet', pay_asset='BETA'); defaults to the quote's choice. Solana SPL pre-flight: when the quote selected an SPL token (USDC/USDT/WETH/BETA), this tool fetches the tx via read-only RPC and verifies it transferred ≥ the expected amount of the expected mint to the treasury's SPL token account. A confirmed mismatch (typically: tokens sent to an ATA derived from pay_to_address) is REJECTED with a structured WRONG_DESTINATION error and the tx_sig is NOT recorded — the quote remains valid so you can re-pay correctly. Indeterminate pre-flights (RPC down, tx not yet visible) fall through to recording.
Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
  • nukez_confirmConfirm a file upload after sandbox curl completes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Confirm a file upload after sandbox curl completes. Call this after executing the curl command returned by nukez_store in sandbox mode. The server computes SHA-256 and records the hash. Requires a payer-signed locker:write envelope: signer-mode deployments sign automatically via the SDK; keyless clients first call without envelope to receive the exact envelope spec to sign, then re-call with envelope=<signed result> (the batch spec returned by nukez_store is also accepted here). LARGE FILES: pass use_job=true after a resumable upload — the synchronous confirm streams the whole stored object on the request path, so large objects confirm through the gateway's asynchronous finalize job instead. Signer mode creates and polls the job automatically; keyless mode signs the job creation spec first, then signs the returned poll spec (fresh nonce each time, re-calling with job_id) until job_status is terminal (complete, partial, or failed).
  • nukez_create_fileCreate a file entry and get upload_url + confirm_url for direct upload.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_create_file" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a file entry and get upload_url + confirm_url for direct upload. The client PUTs raw bytes directly to the upload_url (307-redirects to GCS), then calls nukez_confirm to finalize. Bytes never transit the MCP server. Use this for large files from local/external sources against Cloud Run. For small inline content (<4KB), use nukez_store with data_b64 instead. KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: this server holds no signing key. A call without `envelope` returns action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact spec to sign (method, path, ops, body); sign it with your wallet and re-call with envelope=<signed result>. One file per call in envelope mode.
  • nukez_provisionStep 3: Confirm payment settlement on the gateway and provision the storage locker.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 3: Confirm payment settlement on the gateway and provision the storage locker. Two modes: (a) Without `envelope`: pass pay_req_id + tx_sig (auto-resolved from state). Returns the receipt_id and a hint to build a signed `locker:provision` envelope. (b) With `receipt_id` + `envelope`: forwards the signed envelope to /v1/storage/signed_provision and activates the locker. Also accepts `receipt_id` alone to rehydrate an already-provisioned locker without re-paying.
  • nukez_quoteStep 1: Get storage pricing and payment options.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1: Get storage pricing and payment options. Returns price breakdown and every available payment method (SOL/USDC/USDT/WETH/BETA on Solana, USDC/USDT0/MON/WETH on Monad). Each option carries a `destination_kind`: 'wallet' (native SOL — send lamports to pay_to_address), 'spl_token_account' (Solana SPL tokens — pay_to_address IS already the treasury's token account; pass it DIRECTLY as the transferChecked destination, do NOT derive an ATA from it), or 'evm_address' (Monad — send native value to the address, or call transfer() on the token contract at token_address). SPL options also include a self-contained `spl_transfer` block (program_id, destination_token_account, mint, amount_raw, decimals) you can pass straight to a signer. Review payment_options, pick one, then sign+submit externally and call nukez_pay with the resulting tx_sig. Providers: gcs (default), mongodb, storj, arweave, filecoin, firestore.
  • nukez_recompute_verifyByte-level integrity proof: re-downloads every file from storage, recomputes content hashes, rebuilds the merkle tree, and compares the result against the persisted attestation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Byte-level integrity proof: re-downloads every file from storage, recomputes content hashes, rebuilds the merkle tree, and compares the result against the persisted attestation. Returns match=True when storage bytes still match the recorded hashes, match=False when they have drifted. Cost: scales with total locker bytes (re-downloads everything). Slower than nukez_verify — reach for this only on audits, post-migration sanity checks, or when you suspect drift between storage and the persisted manifest. For routine integrity checks, nukez_verify is the right tool (sub-second, structural). Requires payer authorization (a signed locker:read envelope): signer-mode deployments sign automatically via the SDK; keyless deployments get action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact envelope spec, then re-call with envelope=<signed result>.
  • nukez_rememberStore a structured memory record in your Nukez locker.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "store": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Store a structured memory record in your Nukez locker. Memories are indexed for fast search via nukez_recall. Use namespaces to organize (e.g., 'config', 'context', 'decisions'). Requires: key, content, summary. ENVELOPE: pass a list of 2 envelopes (each with unique nonce, POST path, ops=locker:write) — one for the record file, one for the index.
  • nukez_setupSet up Nukez storage: checks wallet, purchases storage, and provisions locker in a single call.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Set up Nukez storage: checks wallet, purchases storage, and provisions locker in a single call. Call with no args to run the full flow. Call with receipt_id to rehydrate an existing locker. Providers: gcs (default), mongodb, storj, arweave, filecoin, firestore. Payments: Solana (SOL, USDC, USDT, WETH, BETA) and Monad/EVM (MON, USDC, USDT0, WETH) — chain is auto-detected.
  • nukez_storeStore files in your Nukez locker.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_store" says "store": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,325 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...t and re-call with envelope=<signed result>. One file per call in envelope mode."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Store files in your Nukez locker. ALWAYS BATCH: pass ALL the files you want to upload in a SINGLE call, as a list under `files`. Do NOT loop over your file list and call nukez_store once per file — that triggers one on-chain attestation per file (slow + costs SOL fees per push). One nukez_store call with N files triggers exactly ONE attestation for the whole batch. Each list item: {name, <data_source>, content_type?, expected_size_bytes?, expected_sha256?, large?}. UPLOAD PATH PRIORITY: 1. source_url — if the file is available at a public HTTPS URL, pass it and the server fetches directly (fastest, zero token cost). 2. sandbox_path — if you have compute/bash access and the file is on disk, pass the absolute path. 3. local_path — if the file exists on local disk (desktop/CLI environments). 4. data_b64 — LAST RESORT for small content only (<4KB). Sends bytes through your context window. Accepts both base64-encoded binary and plain UTF-8 text. 5. nukez_upload_chunk — if sandbox_path curl failed (HTTP 000 / network blocked), upload in 4KB chunks with sha256 verification. Run the prep script from the response, then call nukez_upload_chunk for each chunk. NEVER base64-encode files >4KB in one call. Upload path is auto-selected based on size and runtime environment. HARD SIZE LIMITS per path: the sandbox curl proxies through the gateway and is capped at 32 MiB (the platform rejects larger request bodies); the chunked ingest pipeline caps at 20 MiB per file. LARGE FILES (>= 32 MiB, any size up to terabytes): pass expected_size_bytes (and ideally the file's expected_sha256) with sandbox_path, or set large=true — the response then returns a resumable direct-to-provider upload session (action_required='execute_upload') with a session-open command and a stdlib-only transfer script that uploads in 8 MiB chunks and resumes after interruptions. Bytes go straight to the storage provider, so the sandbox needs outbound access to the session URI's host. After the transfer, confirm with nukez_confirm(use_job=true). KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: this server holds no signing key. A call without `envelope` returns action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact spec to sign (method, path, ops, body); sign it with your wallet and re-call with envelope=<signed result>. One file per call in envelope mode.
  • nukez_upload_chunkUpload a file in chunks when sandbox curl/network is blocked.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_upload_chunk" says "upload": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Upload a file in chunks when sandbox curl/network is blocked. PREPARATION — run this bash script first to split and hash: python3 -c " import base64, hashlib, os, json, math path = '<SANDBOX_FILE_PATH>' CHUNK = 4096 size = os.path.getsize(path) n = math.ceil(size / CHUNK) os.makedirs('/tmp/nkz', exist_ok=True) hashes = [] with open(path, 'rb') as f: for i in range(n): raw = f.read(CHUNK) h = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() b = base64.b64encode(raw).decode() open(f'/tmp/nkz/{i:04d}.b64','w').write(b) open(f'/tmp/nkz/{i:04d}.sha','w').write(h) hashes.append(h) print(json.dumps({'chunks':n,'bytes':size,'hashes':hashes})) " Then for each chunk: read the .b64 file, read the .sha file, and call this tool: cat /tmp/nkz/0000.b64 → data_b64 cat /tmp/nkz/0000.sha → sha256 nukez_upload_chunk(filename=..., data_b64=..., sha256=..., part_no=0) Set is_last=True on the final chunk. Server verifies sha256 — hash mismatch means token corruption, retry by re-reading. Always use 4KB chunks (CHUNK=4096). Do not use larger chunks. STATELESS RELAY: part_no=0 returns job_id and file_id. Pass both back on every subsequent chunk (required when each chunk is a separate MCP session).
  • nukez_verifyFast structural verification of locker state.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fast structural verification of locker state. Returns merkle root, attestation status, and optional per-file proof. Pass memory_key to verify a specific memory record by key. Cheap: reads the persisted attestation; latency is independent of locker size (~sub-second typical). With push=True, also triggers a fresh on-chain attestation: the gateway enqueues the same background job the async path uses (its Cloud Tasks worker performs the single on-chain push) and polls server-side, returning the settled attestation — or a 202-style accepted response pointing at the verify endpoint if its 90-second poll ceiling expires first. DO NOT call repeatedly after every store/delete just to keep the attestation current — the gateway already runs auto-reattest after every file mutation, gated to skip when the manifest is unchanged since the last attestation, so manual push calls are normally unnecessary. Use push=True only when you explicitly need the on-chain anchor right now and inline. For byte-level proof that storage bytes still match the recorded hashes (re-downloads everything), use nukez_recompute_verify instead.
Only reads 3Claude Code: allow
  • nukez_recallSearch and retrieve memory records from your Nukez locker.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search and retrieve memory records from your Nukez locker. Two modes: exact key lookup (pass key) returns full content + proof, or search (pass namespace/tags/query/prefix) returns matching index entries. ENVELOPE: none needed — both index and record are read via the public receipt-proxy URL. Just pass receipt_id.
  • nukez_retrieveList files or download content from your Nukez locker.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_retrieve" says "retrieve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List files or download content from your Nukez locker. Call with no filenames to list all files. Call with filenames=['file.txt'] to download specific files. KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: a call without `envelope` returns action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact list spec to sign (locker:list, plus locker:read when downloading); sign it with your wallet and re-call with the same arguments plus envelope=<signed result>.
  • nukez_statusCheck wallet balance, locker state, and lifecycle stage.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "nukez_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check wallet balance, locker state, and lifecycle stage. Works at any stage — no active locker required.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:55 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
12
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 12 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 10 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.nukez.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including nukez_delete (destructive), nukez_pay (irreversible), nukez_quote (write), nukez_provision (write), nukez_setup (write) and 7 more

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http nukez https://mcp.nukez.xyz/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_retrieve",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_status",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_recall"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_quote",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_pay",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_provision",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_setup",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_create_file",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_store",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_confirm",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_upload_chunk",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_verify",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_recompute_verify",
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_remember"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__nukez__nukez_delete"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as nukez. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__nukez__nukez_retrieve private-data