PnL Labs — Solana Trust & Risk Checks

by PnLlabs · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by GitHub user PnLlabs

Trust checks for Solana trading: realized-PnL wallet trust, token safety, trade cost, forensics.

Changes · 3

Compare Registry entry

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

Deletes or cancels0Claude Code: deny
Can't be undone0Claude Code: ask
Changes things3Claude Code: ask: see these tools
Only reads1Claude Code: allow: see these tools

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http pnllabs https://api.pnllabs.com/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

4 tools

Changes things 3Creates or changes something that can be changed back.Claude Code: ask

check_trade_costEstimates what a trade of a given size would cost in a Solana token's main liquidity pool.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it
Estimates what a trade of a given size would cost in a Solana token's main liquidity pool. Returns: expected slippage in percent, an estimated round-trip cost calibrated against measured live execution overhead, a recommended maximum size in SOL, pool liquidity, and a verdict (ACCEPTABLE_COST, ELEVATED_COST, HIGH_COST, UNTRADEABLE, NO_POOL, UNKNOWN).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Estimate Trade Execution Cost
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_wallet_forensicsTraces where a Solana wallet's funding came from and how old it is, using on-chain transfer history.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it
Traces where a Solana wallet's funding came from and how old it is, using on-chain transfer history. Returns: origin classification (CEX_FUNDED, WALLET_FUNDED, UNKNOWN_ORIGIN, UNVERIFIABLE_ORIGIN, UNKNOWN), the funding transaction, wallet age, and a fresh_wallet flag.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Trace Wallet Funding Origin
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_wallet_trustRecomputes the realized SOL profit and loss of a Solana wallet from its on-chain transaction history and returns a trust verdict.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it
Recomputes the realized SOL profit and loss of a Solana wallet from its on-chain transaction history and returns a trust verdict. Returns: verdict (TRUSTED, NEUTRAL, UNTRUSTED, INSUFFICIENT, UNVERIFIABLE, UNKNOWN), a confidence level, realized profit/loss in SOL, the number of coins analyzed, stable reason codes, and flags such as known_sniper_bot. Returns UNVERIFIABLE when the history cannot be reconstructed reliably rather than estimating.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check Wallet Trust
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true

Only reads 1Looks things up and changes nothing.Claude Code: allow

check_token_safetyAnalyzes structural risk of a Solana token from on-chain data: real-holder concentration with bonding-curve and liquidity-pool accounts excluded, presence of known sniper-bot addre…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it
Analyzes structural risk of a Solana token from on-chain data: real-holder concentration with bonding-curve and liquidity-pool accounts excluded, presence of known sniper-bot addresses among early buyers, and a simulated buy/sell round trip to detect honeypot behavior. Returns: verdict (LOW_RISK, ELEVATED, HIGH_RISK, CRITICAL, UNKNOWN), stable reason codes, and top-holder percentages. Scope is structural only; it does not detect risk that exists purely in trading behavior.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check Token Structural Risk
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0: Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4: Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.; check_token_safety
check_trade_cost
check_wallet_forensics
check_wallet_trust
Can send data out0: Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:54 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable: yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200
tools/list served without credentials: yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3
Protocol version: 2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none
Authorization servers: none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport: no
Dynamic client registration: not observed
Client ID metadata documents: not observed

WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
Matched text
https://api.pnllabs.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_wallet_trust (write), check_wallet_forensics (write), check_trade_cost (write)
What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http pnllabs https://api.pnllabs.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__pnllabs__check_token_safety"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__pnllabs__check_wallet_trust",
      "mcp__pnllabs__check_wallet_forensics",
      "mcp__pnllabs__check_trade_cost"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pnllabs. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules

mcp__pnllabs__check_wallet_trust untrusted-input
mcp__pnllabs__check_wallet_forensics untrusted-input
mcp__pnllabs__check_trade_cost untrusted-input
mcp__pnllabs__check_token_safety untrusted-input

Keep track

Get told when this server's tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.PnLlabs/pnllabs/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

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