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temporal-mcp

by MirrorEthic · remote · local (pypi) · no sign-in to list tools · v0.2.0 · published by GitHub user MirrorEthic

Wall-clock awareness for LLM agents. Two tools: elapsed-time-between-turns + day rollover detection.

Changes · 1
CompareRegistry entry

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http temporal https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • temporal_tickAdvance the temporal clock for a thread and return a snapshot (now / prev / gap / day_rollover / fresh_thread).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Advance the temporal clock for a thread and return a snapshot (now / prev / gap / day_rollover / fresh_thread). Call once per user turn. Pass a stable `thread_key` (e.g. the conversation ID) so gap deltas remain meaningful across page reloads.
Only reads 1Claude Code: allow
  • temporal_peekRead the current temporal snapshot for a thread WITHOUT advancing state.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the current temporal snapshot for a thread WITHOUT advancing state. Use this when you want the gap delta but the call is not the canonical per-turn event.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including temporal_tick (write)

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http temporal https://temporal-mcp.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__temporal__temporal_peek"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__temporal__temporal_tick"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as temporal. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__temporal__temporal_peek private-data, untrusted-input