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presign-guard

by Fizzl13 · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.6.0 · published by GitHub user Fizzl13

Safe to sign? EVM/Solana/XRPL/Algorand txs, permits, EIP-7702, tokens; OFAC screen: green/orange/red

Final · 2Changes · 5

8 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 5 change things and 1 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

2 checks matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http presign-guard https://presign-guard.fizzl.eu/mcp

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "presign_quick_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "presign_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

8 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • presign_checkPaid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before you sign.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "presign_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before you sign. Send the transaction, token approval, EIP-712 signature (Permit, Permit2, EIP-3009 x402 payment, Seaport) or EIP-7702 authorization (type authorization: delegating the wallet to a contract, the sweeper trap) your agent is about to sign; get back green, orange or red with reason codes: who gets access, whether the spender or recipient is flagged, sanctioned (OFAC SDN) or unverified, unlimited allowances, and the token itself (honeypot, fake look-alike, high tax). On Solana (type solana, the base64 wire transaction): every instruction decoded and the transaction simulated (token account takeovers, System Assign, unlimited delegates, durable nonces, hidden owner or delegate changes). On the XRP Ledger (type xrpl, the unsigned tx JSON): account takeovers (SetRegularKey, SignerListSet, disabling the master key), fake RLUSD, partial payments, missing destination tags, trust-line and issuer risks, and DEX offers far below market. On Algorand (type algorand, base64 msgpack transaction or group in transactions): rekeys, closing the account or an asset to someone else, clawbacks, fake USDC, app update/delete/clear, simulated. Only proceed on green; on orange ask your user; never sign on red. Same as POST /v1/check. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • presign_quick_checkFree: the green/orange/red verdict only, for a transaction, token approval, EIP-712 signature, XRP Ledger transaction (type xrpl) or Algorand transaction (type algorand) your agent…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "presign_quick_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free: the green/orange/red verdict only, for a transaction, token approval, EIP-712 signature, XRP Ledger transaction (type xrpl) or Algorand transaction (type algorand) your agent is about to sign. Limited to 10 calls per hour. For the reason codes and details use presign_check ($0.01); for a plain-language explanation presign_check_explain ($0.03).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • feedbackReport a bug, a missing feature or anything else about this service, in a structured way.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report a bug, a missing feature or anything else about this service, in a structured way. Free. A person reads every report; nothing is run or changed automatically.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_walletPaid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent pays an address, or before accepting money from one.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent pays an address, or before accepting money from one. Send any chain's wallet address (EVM 0x..., Solana, Tron, Bitcoin, XRP Ledger, Algorand, or another currency OFAC lists). Get back green/orange/red: red SANCTIONED_ADDRESS with the SDN entry (name, programs, currency) when the address is on the OFAC SDN list, red or orange when GoPlus reports theft, phishing, laundering or mixer use (EVM). Never pay or accept funds on red. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_quick_verdictFree: the green/orange/red verdict and grade only, for a Solana or EVM token your agent is about to buy, hold or accept.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free: the green/orange/red verdict and grade only, for a Solana or EVM token your agent is about to buy, hold or accept. Limited to 10 free calls per hour (shared with presign_quick_check). For the reasons, one-line summary and market data use token_verdict ($0.01).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_verdictPaid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent buys, holds or accepts a token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent buys, holds or accepts a token. Send the chain (solana, base, ethereum, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bsc, xrpl, algorand) and the token address, mint, CURRENCY.rIssuer or Algorand asset id; get back green/orange/red, a grade (SAFE, CAUTION, RISKY, AVOID), reason codes (mint or freeze authority still active, honeypot, tax or transfer fee, LP not locked, low liquidity, new token, concentrated holders, rugged), a one-line summary, and market data (price, liquidity, market cap, 24h volume, age). Same as GET /v1/token. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wallet_approvalsPaid ($0.02 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): audit the open token approvals of a wallet on an EVM chain (base, ethereum, arbit…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid ($0.02 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): audit the open token approvals of a wallet on an EVM chain (base, ethereum, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bsc) or on Solana, for example your agent's own wallet as a periodic check. Get back green/orange/red, a grade, a one-line summary and every approval with its spender. EVM, every ERC-20 allowance: flagged malicious (red), a plain wallet, on a doubt list, an unverified contract or an unlimited allowance to a spender not on the GoPlus trust list (orange), with a revoke.cash link. Solana, every SPL token delegation (Approve): a delegate on the OFAC SDN list (red), a delegate that is a plain wallet or an unlimited delegation (orange), with the token account to revoke on; Token-2022 tokens with a permanent delegate are listed too. NFT approvals are not covered. Same as GET /v1/approvals. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Claude Code: allow
  • presign_check_explainPaid ($0.03 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): the same verdict and reason codes as presign_check, plus a 3 to 5 sentence plain-…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "presign_check_explain" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid ($0.03 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): the same verdict and reason codes as presign_check, plus a 3 to 5 sentence plain-language explanation a person can read before approving (lang en or nl). Same as POST /v1/check/explain. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Install

Pinned to version 1.6.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http presign-guard https://presign-guard.fizzl.eu/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__presign-guard__presign_check_explain"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__presign-guard__presign_quick_check",
      "mcp__presign-guard__token_quick_verdict",
      "mcp__presign-guard__presign_check",
      "mcp__presign-guard__token_verdict",
      "mcp__presign-guard__wallet_approvals",
      "mcp__presign-guard__screen_wallet",
      "mcp__presign-guard__feedback"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. It assumes the server is installed as presign-guard. Review it before you use it.