Eclipse Trust MCP
io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/trustCYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLCstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Is this bench result real? Who issued it, at what scope, anchored where? One call answers.
5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Anlyon alternative
1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
trust_verify_receiptVerify a Herald receipt hash: recomputed hash match, the record it belongs to, issuer, anchor state (ANCHORED/PENDING/FAILED/NOT_ENQUEUED) with chain + tx + proof bundle, offline p…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a Herald receipt hash: recomputed hash match, the record it belongs to, issuer, anchor state (ANCHORED/PENDING/FAILED/NOT_ENQUEUED) with chain + tx + proof bundle, offline proof verification, and a verify_recipe. Unknown hash returns typed NOT_FOUND.
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
trust_get_bench_verdictThe current Verity bench verdict for a product, byte-verbatim with scope attached, plus the computed pointer block.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "trust_get_bench_verdict" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The current Verity bench verdict for a product, byte-verbatim with scope attached, plus the computed pointer block. No verdict returns typed NO_VERDICT.
trust_get_validation_recordResolve an ERC-8004 Validation Registry record by validation_id, request_hash, or product.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "trust_get_validation_record" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve an ERC-8004 Validation Registry record by validation_id, request_hash, or product. Testnet records are labelled TESTNET; mainnet lookups return typed NOT_PUBLISHED_MAINNET.
trust_resolve_agentResolve an agent by ERC-8004 agent_id, DID, or registration URL: registration summary plus a trust summary computed from the records at call time.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "trust_resolve_agent" says "resolve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "resolve" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve an agent by ERC-8004 agent_id, DID, or registration URL: registration summary plus a trust summary computed from the records at call time.
trust_statusServer health + data provenance: index build time, source recompute checks, verdict/receipt/anchor counts, mainnet vs testnet posture.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "trust_status" says "status": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Server health + data provenance: index build time, source recompute checks, verdict/receipt/anchor counts, mainnet vs testnet posture. Call this first to judge freshness.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http trust https://cetech.ai/trust/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http trust https://cetech.ai/trust/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__trust__trust_status",
"mcp__trust__trust_get_bench_verdict",
"mcp__trust__trust_get_validation_record"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__trust__trust_verify_receipt",
"mcp__trust__trust_resolve_agent"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trust. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__trust__trust_resolve_agent untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/trust/verify?hash=b89cf724a18d3c00cdca9127c2b44b893337acce72fdf5162c68725edaebfe41" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b89cf724a18d, from Oct 27, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/trust/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/trust)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 18:17 UTC.