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Trust Gate

by CWNApps · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v0.2.0 · published by GitHub user CWNApps

Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify.

Changes · 7
CompareRegistry entry

7 tools: 7 change things.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http trust-gate https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

7 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • audit_my_agent_inventoryRank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most). Read-only: it mints no receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.
  • check_egressEgress classification check.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Egress classification check. Scans a data sample for a finite list of sensitivity markers and classifies as NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED sets blocked=true; this tool cannot block anything itself, and NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send. Returns classification, retention info, and a tamper-evident receipt.
  • gate_decisionTwo-phase decision gate with a real verdict.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Two-phase decision gate with a real verdict. PREVIEW returns ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE with the risk tier and reasons, plus a preview_id, without acting. COMMIT re-evaluates the same inputs and mints a signed receipt for the verdict. Only ALLOW returns a GRANTED permit; DENY returns DENIED; ESCALATE returns WITHHELD_PENDING_HUMAN and a human must decide outside this tool. Applies only to actions the caller routes through it: it does not observe or block what an agent does. Verb-tier heuristic on the action name and resource, not a proof. Stateless. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type, triggered_by_source, decision_model.
  • mint_action_receiptMint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Attestation values are caller claims: allowlisted to safe characters, signed, not verified. Decisions that contain a gate verdict word are reserved for gate_decision.
  • mint_receipt_for_record_changeMint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).
  • run_exit_drillVendor exit readiness drill.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "run_exit_drill" says "run": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Vendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama). Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational; it signs one receipt, which creates the signing key on a host that has none yet.
  • verify_receiptVerify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). ok=true means unchanged since signing, signed, kid consistent with the embedded key, and (require_pq default on) at least one post-quantum leg verified; unsigned receipts fail. It does not prove who signed: pass expected_kid to pin the signer's Ed25519 key; a pin counts only when that key's own signature verifies (see signer_pinned). The post-quantum keys in a receipt are not covered by the kid.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:51 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including mint_receipt_for_record_change (write), audit_my_agent_inventory (write), mint_action_receipt (write), verify_receipt (write), gate_decision (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http trust-gate https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__trust-gate__mint_receipt_for_record_change",
      "mcp__trust-gate__audit_my_agent_inventory",
      "mcp__trust-gate__mint_action_receipt",
      "mcp__trust-gate__verify_receipt",
      "mcp__trust-gate__gate_decision",
      "mcp__trust-gate__check_egress",
      "mcp__trust-gate__run_exit_drill"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trust-gate. Review it before you use it.