Power Strip Security
io.github.AlbertBalestrini/power-strip-securityAlbertBalestrinistreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned
Prompt-injection shield: read pages, scan content, audit MCP servers. Pay per call with x402.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 3
- No findings
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
audit_mcp_serverCheck an MCP server for tool poisoning before you connect: hidden instructions, secrecy, sensitive-file access, cross-tool shadowing and rug pulls.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Check an MCP server for tool poisoning before you connect: hidden instructions, secrecy, sensitive-file access, cross-tool shadowing and rug pulls. Pass its URL (we list its tools read-only) or paste its tools. Optional pinned fingerprints detect changed tools. Costs US$0.01 in USDC on Base (x402); servers that cannot be listed are not charged.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
scan_contentScan HTML or text you already have (an email, a document, a tool result) for prompt injection.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Scan HTML or text you already have (an email, a document, a tool result) for prompt injection. Returns the risk report and the cleaned text wrapped as untrusted data. Costs US$0.002 in USDC on Base (x402). Max 256 KB.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
read_urlFetch a public web page or PDF and return it as clean markdown with hidden text, invisible characters and data-exfiltration links removed, plus a prompt-injection risk report.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_url" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "read_url" says "read" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a public web page or PDF and return it as clean markdown with hidden text, invisible characters and data-exfiltration links removed, plus a prompt-injection risk report. Costs US$0.005 in USDC on Base (x402); pages that cannot be read are not charged. Respects robots.txt.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http power-strip-security https://api.powerstripsecurity.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http power-strip-security https://api.powerstripsecurity.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__power-strip-security__read_url",
"mcp__power-strip-security__scan_content",
"mcp__power-strip-security__audit_mcp_server"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as power-strip-security. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__power-strip-security__read_url untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__power-strip-security__scan_content untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__power-strip-security__audit_mcp_server untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/io.github.AlbertBalestrini/power-strip-security/verify?hash=3162755c6d75fc02f698d5c1f566f5a4f2f6cbc1b83d01e2a4e0c74c781abd1e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3162755c6d75, from Oct 30, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.AlbertBalestrini/power-strip-security/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/io.github.AlbertBalestrini/power-strip-security)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 23:18 UTC.