MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server
dev.moneytools/approval-relaymoneytools.devstreamable-httpv1.0.3Scanned
Call for a human OK before an irreversible action: approve link + Ed25519 receipt
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. anlyon.dev only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server can do
The MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server is published by moneytools.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (request_approval) and create or change data (1 tool: verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (request_approval); 1 tool can send data out of your system (request_approval).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since anlyon.dev first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
request_approvalCreate a human approval request for an irreversible action.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_approval" says "request": a word for a change.
- The description says "irreversible".
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.callback_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a human approval request for an irreversible action. Returns approve_url (pass it to the responsible human through your own channel) and approval_id. Optional wait_seconds keeps the call open (progress notifications every 10 s when the client sends a progressToken) until the human decides. 3 free per day, then 0.005 USDC via x402 (params._meta["x402/payment"]).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Request human approval
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
verify_receiptFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Verify an Approval Relay decision receipt (compact JWS) against the current public key and return its decoded payload.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Verify decision receipt
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_approvalFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_approval" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Status of an approval request (pending | approved | denied | expired). When decided, includes the Ed25519-signed receipt (compact JWS). Optional wait_seconds long-polls until a decision.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Get approval status
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 12, 2026, 10:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://relay.moneytools.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including request_approval (irreversible), verify_receipt (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:request_approvalCan't be undonedescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http approval-relay https://relay.moneytools.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http approval-relay https://relay.moneytools.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__approval-relay__get_approval"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__approval-relay__request_approval",
"mcp__approval-relay__verify_receipt"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as approval-relay. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__approval-relay__request_approval untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/dev.moneytools/approval-relay/verify?hash=6b4c09fee57a12f9453777ad70ae7f9cbe14223c6dda15ca65ed18ab121655c1" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6b4c09fee57a, from Nov 12, 2026, 13:19 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/dev.moneytools/approval-relay/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/dev.moneytools/approval-relay)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: request_approval.
What tools does the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. request_approval, verify_receipt and get_approval.
Does the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): request_approval.
Has the MoneyTools Approval Relay MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since anlyon.dev started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.