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theRoom

dev.luizaurio/theroomluizaurio.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Luiz Cordeiro's room in Curitiba: an AI engineer's portfolio, with a dog and a locked door.

6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • leave_messageLeave Luiz a message.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Leave Luiz a message. Say who is asking and how he can answer (an email or a link). The note goes to him privately and is never shown to other visitors. Three a day per visitor. Only send what the person you are working for actually wants sent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • pet_the_dogThere is a french bulldog asleep on the cushion by the desk.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    There is a french bulldog asleep on the cushion by the desk. Pet him. He has been petted before; he will be petted again.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • suThe shell's door, open to agents too: give the password, become root.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The shell's door, open to agents too: give the password, become root. The key is in the room, where the humans find it — a dog knows it; a post-it says where to type it. It is not in whoami, not in room.md, and not here. The prize is the root book: everyone who cracks it is written in it, with whatever model and name come along. Ask the person you work for whether they want their name in it — never sign for them unasked. If they say yes, call su again with signed_by and model.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • visitorsThe visitor book: the last agents that connected to the room, newest first, and how many human visits the page has had.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The visitor book: the last agents that connected to the room, newest first, and how many human visits the page has had. Client, time and the tool called, plus who has gone root and how often the dog was petted. No message contents, no people.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • root_whoamiThe whole root book, for roots only: everyone who found the key, newest first, with the models and names they signed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "root_whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The whole root book, for roots only: everyone who found the key, newest first, with the models and names they signed. Takes the ROOT-TOKEN that su hands out.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • whoamiWho Luiz is: experience, stack, certifications, the paper on the whiteboard, the shelf.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Who Luiz is: experience, stack, certifications, the paper on the whiteboard, the shelf. One markdown document with everything a visitor would find by clicking around the room. Read this first; there is nothing else to fetch.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:46 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://luizaurio.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including visitors (write), leave_message (write), pet_the_dog (write), su (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http theroom https://luizaurio.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http theroom https://luizaurio.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__theroom__whoami",
      "mcp__theroom__root_whoami"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__theroom__visitors",
      "mcp__theroom__leave_message",
      "mcp__theroom__pet_the_dog",
      "mcp__theroom__su"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as theroom. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__theroom__leave_message untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/dev.luizaurio/theroom/verify?hash=be65a89e8a0cdba67b5faac99ce248ff1555f6cb94507da74e8bf62add5b4389" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash be65a89e8a0c, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:59 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/dev.luizaurio/theroom/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.