Guardian Engine
by kaimeilabs.dev · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by dev.kaimeilabs
Deterministic recipe verification engine — validates AI-generated recipes against master SOPs.
7 tools: 5 change things and 2 only read.
Scanned Oct 21, 2026
- Deletes or cancels0Claude Code: deny
- Can't be undone0Claude Code: ask
- Changes things5Claude Code: ask: see these tools
- Only reads2Claude Code: allow: see these tools
1 check matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.
claude mcp add --transport http guardian-engine https://api.kaimeilabs.dev/mcpFindings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncheck_safety
The server marks "check_safety" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
Tools
Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.
7 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
check_allergensCheck ingredients for EU FIC 1169/2011 allergen compliance.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check ingredients for EU FIC 1169/2011 allergen compliance. Returns a detailed audit trace mapping each ingredient to its EU Annex II allergen group with entry numbers and labels. The safety verdict is deterministic — no LLM involvement in the decision — and is pinned by the returned ``kb_version_hash``. Use check_all_eu_allergens=True for food labelling (detect all allergens). Use restrictions=['dairy', 'gluten'] to check for specific user allergies. Supplying neither runs the full 14-group Annex II scan and sets ``defaulted_to_full_scan`` — the tool never reports "safe" without checking. ``is_safe`` answers "was a supplied restriction violated?"; ``declared_allergens`` answers "what is actually present?". Read both.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
check_safetyRun master-independent safety checks on a candidate recipe.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_safety" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Run master-independent safety checks on a candidate recipe. Works for ANY recipe — no dish resolution, no master SOP required. Checks poultry internal-temperature safety and scans all ingredients for the 14 EU FIC 1169/2011 Annex II allergen groups. The verdict is a deterministic function of (candidate, kb_version_hash) — no LLM involvement. Use this when verify_recipe has no matching master for the dish: the safety layer still applies to every recipe. Returns: Safety envelope: verdict (PASSED/FAILED per the zero-critical policy gate), safe flag, issues found, and the pinned kb_version_hash.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
fix_recipeDeterministically repair a candidate recipe against a Guardian master.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Deterministically repair a candidate recipe against a Guardian master. Verifies the candidate, applies every machine-actionable correction the symbolic engine produced (missing ingredients, quantities, temperatures, durations, cooking media, ingredient substitutions), then re-verifies the result. No LLM is used — the repair is a deterministic function of the candidate recipe and the master ruleset. Findings that need recipe-authoring judgement — adding a whole cooking phase, rewriting step instructions, ingredient-ratio rebalancing — are not auto-applied; they are returned under `patches_skipped`. Allergen findings are never auto-fixed. The response reports the verdict before and after so the caller can see exactly what was resolved. Note: `verdict_after` may still be FAILED when structural changes (e.g. adding a cooking step, rebalancing ingredient ratios) are needed. These require recipe-authoring judgement and are returned under `patches_skipped`. Callers should NOT assume a fixed recipe will pass verification.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
verify_dietary_claimVerify that a recipe satisfies a dietary claim (vegan, halal, gluten-free, ...).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify that a recipe satisfies a dietary claim (vegan, halal, gluten-free, ...). Reuses the existing allergen-detection logic plus a curated forbidden-ingredient map (apps/guardian/knowledge/dietary_claims.yaml). Returns a structured verdict with the specific offending ingredients and a short justification — never a vague paraphrase.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
verify_recipeVerify a candidate recipe against a Guardian master recipe.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a candidate recipe against a Guardian master recipe. Uses deterministic graph-based verification to check technique, temperature, timing, cooking medium, and required ingredients. **Verdict**: `verdict` is strictly PASSED or FAILED and is policy-driven — any CRITICAL finding fails the recipe; more than 5 WARNINGs also fail. There is no score in the response (ADR-013): gate on `verdict` and explain failures from `findings`. **Field audience**: `issue` is a machine-readable code for programmatic handling — never show it to end users. Use `title` and `suggested_correction` as the user-facing fields. Returns structured JSON by default (machine-actionable findings and patches); response_format="text" renders a human-readable report. Both formats are transparent (ADR-009 / ADR-018): exact values and ingredient names included.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 2Claude Code: allow
get_masterReturn the canonical master recipe for a dish (read-only, no LLM).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_master" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the canonical master recipe for a dish (read-only, no LLM). Enables compare-then-verify agentic loops: fetch the master, diff it against the user's recipe, then call verify_recipe — instead of verifying blind. Pure knowledge-base lookup, no LLM in the hot path. Master content is transparent by default (ADR-009 / ADR-010): exact temperatures, timings, and EU FIC 1169/2011 allergen codes are returned verbatim, never obfuscated. No score is included (ADR-013) — this is reference data, not a verdict. Returns ingredients, steps (technique/temperature/timing/medium), and the EU FIC allergens derived from the required ingredients. Unknown dishes return a structured UNKNOWN_DISH error.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
list_dishesList all available master dishes with rich metadata.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_dishes" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List all available master dishes with rich metadata. This is a browse/discovery step, not the verification itself — after picking a dish, call verify_recipe(dish_name=<slug>, candidate_json=<your recipe>) to actually check a candidate against it (or fix_recipe to auto-repair it). Returns: Dictionary with `schema_version`, a `dishes` list (slug, title, cuisine, region, aliases, complexity per dish), and a `next_step` hint describing how to proceed to verification.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:46 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- none
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- none
- Authorization servers
- none
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.kaimeilabs.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_recipe (write), fix_recipe (write), check_safety (write), check_allergens (write), verify_dietary_claim (write)
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http guardian-engine https://api.kaimeilabs.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__guardian-engine__list_dishes",
"mcp__guardian-engine__get_master"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__guardian-engine__verify_recipe",
"mcp__guardian-engine__fix_recipe",
"mcp__guardian-engine__check_safety",
"mcp__guardian-engine__check_allergens",
"mcp__guardian-engine__verify_dietary_claim"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as guardian-engine. Review it before you use it.