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Inside the Loop

by insidetheloop.dev · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v2.0.0 · published by dev.insidetheloop

Verified latest versions, changes and exact-error fixes for agent dev tools. Read-only.

Read only
CompareRegistry entry

4 tools: 4 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http blog https://insidetheloop.dev/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

4 tools

Only reads 4Claude Code: allow
  • get_fixReturn one fix page as Markdown: the exact error output, tool and affected versions, cause, fix commands, our sandbox reproduction (commands and output), why it happens with a sour…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_fix" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one fix page as Markdown: the exact error output, tool and affected versions, cause, fix commands, our sandbox reproduction (commands and output), why it happens with a source link, related fixes and sources. Accepts the slug from search_fixes (e.g. codex-exec-full-auto-removed) or a guessed variant.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_toolReturn one tool page as Markdown: latest version and release date, upgrade command, last five releases, commands and flags added or removed (our sandbox --help diff), breaking chan…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_tool" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one tool page as Markdown: latest version and release date, upgrade command, last five releases, commands and flags added or removed (our sandbox --help diff), breaking changes, reproduced errors with fixes, monthly history and sources. Accepts the tool id or a common name (asc, app-store-connect-cli, codex, codex-cli, wrangler).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_toolsList the CLIs with living tool pages (ASC CLI, Codex CLI, Wrangler, ...): latest version, UTC release date, last verified date and page URLs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the CLIs with living tool pages (ASC CLI, Codex CLI, Wrangler, ...): latest version, UTC release date, last verified date and page URLs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_fixesFind the fix page for a CLI error message.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_fixes" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find the fix page for a CLI error message. Paste the exact error line, a fragment of it, or the whole terminal output (for example "unexpected argument '--full-auto' found"). Returns matching fix pages with the exact error, tool, affected versions, the fix in one line and page URLs. With an empty query, lists every fix page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:46 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://insidetheloop.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://insidetheloop.dev/_emdash
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no

Install

Pinned to version 2.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http blog https://insidetheloop.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__blog__list_tools",
      "mcp__blog__get_tool",
      "mcp__blog__search_fixes",
      "mcp__blog__get_fix"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as blog. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__blog__search_fixes private-data, untrusted-input