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Pick My Secret Santa

com.pickmysecretsanta/pick-my-secret-santapickmysecretsanta.comstreamable-httpv1.1.1Scanned

Runs a Secret Santa name draw in chat and gives each person a private reveal link.

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • pick_secret_santa_giftFilters Santa's vetted 212 hand-checked gift ideas - the Secret Santa subset of the shared 255-idea bank it shares with its sister site The Present Picker, sorted here for Secret S…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Filters Santa's vetted 212 hand-checked gift ideas - the Secret Santa subset of the shared 255-idea bank it shares with its sister site The Present Picker, sorted here for Secret Santa by the budget band your group agreed for its draw - with strict parameters, and returns up to three picks. Parameters: budget_band (required: under_25, 25_to_50, 50_to_100, over_100); recipient_type (anyone, kid - only ideas from the bank's Kid shelf, or adult - everything except the Kid shelf); one interest hint (books, cooking, cozy, fitness, games, gardening, music, outdoors, science, tech, travel, or surprise) which ranks matches first; and avoid, a list of words - any idea whose name, blurb, or why mentions an avoid word is excluded, and the answer says how many ideas the filters set aside. Each pick names the kind of gift, why it fits, and what to look for and avoid. No brands, no stores, no exact prices: budget bands are guides, not exact prices. This tool never asks who the gift is for by name and knows nothing about any draw.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Pick a Secret Santa gift
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • plan_secret_santa_setupConfigures a Secret Santa group of 3 to 30 right here in chat and hands the organizer one pre-filled link to pickmysecretsanta.com, where the zero-knowledge draw runs in their brow…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Configures a Secret Santa group of 3 to 30 right here in chat and hands the organizer one pre-filled link to pickmysecretsanta.com, where the zero-knowledge draw runs in their browser - no server sees the matches, and each match will live inside one private link - hidden from plain sight, not locked. Give it the group's names and, optionally, a group name, a budget band, and keep_apart pairs (two-name lists, like [["Ana", "Ben"]], for people who must not draw each other): it validates the setup (3 to 30 people, no shared names - the site's draw cannot tell two same-named people apart) and checks that a valid draw exists under the keep-apart pairs before it returns the link with the group, names, budget, and pairs already in the form, plus the site's honest warnings; if the pairs leave no fair draw, it names the conflict plainly and returns no link. The link carries setup only - nobody has been assigned anyone. Names are used once to build the link and are never stored. With only a headcount (group_size) and no names, it instead returns the setup checklist the site prescribes: what to agree out loud first (buy-by date, what counts as a gift, the late-joiner rule, the reveal), the budget step, and how the browser draw works.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Plan a Secret Santa setup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • explain_secret_santa_rulesThe rules and fairness answers pickmysecretsanta.com itself publishes, worded the site's way.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_secret_santa_rules" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The rules and fairness answers pickmysecretsanta.com itself publishes, worded the site's way. Topics: basics (the classic rules), fairness_and_secrecy (how the sealed draw works and its honest limits), organizer_view (the organizer sees names and links, never matches), keep_apart_pairs, late_joiner (the two honest ways to add someone after the draw), budget (the four bands), white_elephant (how it differs).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Explain Secret Santa rules
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 5, 2026, 03:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 5, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.pickmysecretsanta.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including pick_secret_santa_gift (write), plan_secret_santa_setup (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http pick-my-secret-santa https://mcp.pickmysecretsanta.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http pick-my-secret-santa https://mcp.pickmysecretsanta.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__pick-my-secret-santa__explain_secret_santa_rules"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__pick-my-secret-santa__pick_secret_santa_gift",
      "mcp__pick-my-secret-santa__plan_secret_santa_setup"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pick-my-secret-santa. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/com.pickmysecretsanta/pick-my-secret-santa/verify?hash=5f6729f9b43b7cf25d3a4d4d83aa5ff8e3519d7ffd0cb67a886d2ab519cfef5e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 5f6729f9b43b, from Nov 5, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.pickmysecretsanta/pick-my-secret-santa/changes.xml

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Badge

anlyon.dev badge for com.pickmysecretsanta/pick-my-secret-santa
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/com.pickmysecretsanta/pick-my-secret-santa.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.pickmysecretsanta/pick-my-secret-santa)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 04:18 UTC.