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MandateShield AI Payment Evidence

com.mandateshield/payment-authoritymandateshield.comstreamable-httpv1.13.0Scanned

Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.

3 tools: 3 do something that can't be undone.

Tools: 0 delete, 3 irreversible, 0 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_ai_payment_authorityUse before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_ai_payment_authority" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.http_request.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...r a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized=false; use the strict cryptographic tool for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • normalize_agent_payment_protocolUse when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields …2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "normalize_agent_payment_protocol" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...rifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authoriz..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "normalize_agent_payment_protocol" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "normalize_agent_payment_protocol" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope. X402 requires source-matched network+payTo identity and MPP requires source-matched HTTPS service-origin+method identity; merchant_id alone is insufficient. Evidence references are not independently verified. projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance: this tool never verifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authorized=false under assurance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • verify_cryptographic_payment_authorityUse only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supp…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "verify_cryptographic_payment_authority" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 checkout/delegate-chain and Visa TAP structured-field/trust-store processing remain external. A qualifying live ALLOW creates only a short RESERVED authorization and cumulative-budget allocation. This MCP tool never executes payment and exposes no processor transition: a separate trusted gateway with an audience-bound PROCESSOR key must CONSUME and freshly redeem the provider-bound permit before attempting an idempotent provider operation, then reconcile the outcome.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:35 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_ai_payment_authority (irreversible), normalize_agent_payment_protocol (irreversible), verify_cryptographic_payment_authority (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn2 info
  • Warnnormalize_agent_payment_protocol

    The server marks "normalize_agent_payment_protocol" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "normalize_agent_payment_protocol" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • Infocheck_ai_payment_authority

    The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...r a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys."

    What this check looks for
  • Infonormalize_agent_payment_protocol

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...rifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authoriz..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 1.13.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http payment-authority https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http payment-authority https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__payment-authority__check_ai_payment_authority",
      "mcp__payment-authority__normalize_agent_payment_protocol",
      "mcp__payment-authority__verify_cryptographic_payment_authority"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as payment-authority. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__payment-authority__check_ai_payment_authority outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/com.mandateshield/payment-authority/verify?hash=d28ab329ab18081c2a96c96130a35764583f5294d91bcaac517d09b0c91a1020" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d28ab329ab18, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:51 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.mandateshield/payment-authority/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:58 UTC.