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Google Cloud Run

com.googleapis.run/mcprun.googleapis.comstreamable-httpv2.0.0Scanned

Deploy applications to Cloud Run

5 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things and 2 only read.

Tools: 3 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
  • deploy_service_from_archiveDeploy a Cloud Run service directly from a self-contained source code archive (.tar.gz), skipping the container image build step for faster deployment.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deploy_service_from_archive" says "deploy": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deploy a Cloud Run service directly from a self-contained source code archive (.tar.gz), skipping the container image build step for faster deployment. The archive must include all dependencies: - For compiled languages (Go, Java), include pre-compiled binaries. - For scripting languages (Python, Node.js), include pre-installed libraries (e.g., vendor/, node_modules/). Deployment steps: 1. Package source code and dependencies into a .tar.gz archive (max 250MiB). It's recommended to create archive from the root of the application's source directory. 2. Upload the archive to a Google Cloud Storage bucket, preferably in the same region as the service. 3. Deploy to Cloud Run using this tool, specifying: - source_code: Google Cloud Storage object path to the archive (e.g., gs://bucket/object). - command: Command to start the application. - base_image_uri: Base image for the container (e.g., go124, nodejs24, python314). See https://docs.cloud.google.com/run/docs/configuring/services/runtime-base-images for options. The runtime picked should match the local environment. - args: (Optional) Arguments for the command. - env: (Optional) Environment variables (e.g., name: `PYTHONPATH`, value: `./vendor`). - ports: (Optional) Container ports to expose (defaults to 8080).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • deploy_service_from_file_contentsDeploys a Cloud Run service directly from local source files.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deploy_service_from_file_contents" says "deploy": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deploys a Cloud Run service directly from local source files. This method is suitable for scripting languages like Python and Node.js, of which the source code can be embedded in the request. This is ideal for quick tests and development feedback loops. You must include all necessary dependencies within the source files because it skips the build step for faster deployment. **Key Requirements:** 1. source_code: Should set to sourceCode.inlinedSource.sources with array of source files, each having `filename` and `content`. 2. Size limit: you are subject to total request size limit of 50MiB.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • deploy_service_from_imageDeploy a container image from Artifact Registry or Docker Hub as a Cloud Run service.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deploy_service_from_image" says "deploy": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deploy a container image from Artifact Registry or Docker Hub as a Cloud Run service.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_serviceGet info about a Cloud Run service, such as its URI and whether the deploy succeeded.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_service" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "uri": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get info about a Cloud Run service, such as its URI and whether the deploy succeeded.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_servicesList Cloud Run services in a given Google Cloud project and region.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List Cloud Run services in a given Google Cloud project and region.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://run.googleapis.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://accounts.google.com/
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 destructive). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://run.googleapis.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including deploy_service_from_image (destructive), deploy_service_from_archive (destructive), deploy_service_from_file_contents (destructive)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 2.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http run https://run.googleapis.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http run https://run.googleapis.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__run__get_service",
      "mcp__run__list_services"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__run__deploy_service_from_image",
      "mcp__run__deploy_service_from_archive",
      "mcp__run__deploy_service_from_file_contents"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as run. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__run__get_service untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/com.googleapis.run/mcp/verify?hash=132828dba07e8b1cfbc85b80b606849c4e26c064a629f27663071e3d5d6fe8cc" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 132828dba07e, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:12 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.googleapis.run/mcp/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:55 UTC.