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Front Sentinel

com.frontsentinel/domain-securityfrontsentinel.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Read-only security checks for dApp domains: registry lock, DNSSEC, CAA, SRI, SEAL DNS controls

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • check_registry_lockReads the domain's EPP status codes from RDAP and tells whether registry lock (serverUpdateProhibited + serverTransferProhibited) is on, partly on or off, and which registrar-level…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_registry_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_registry_lock" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_registry_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads the domain's EPP status codes from RDAP and tells whether registry lock (serverUpdateProhibited + serverTransferProhibited) is on, partly on or off, and which registrar-level locks are set.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_seal_dns_registrarGoes through the 16 controls of the SEAL Security Frameworks certification for DNS & Registrar and marks what public data shows for each: ok, partial, gap, not visible from outside…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Goes through the 16 controls of the SEAL Security Frameworks certification for DNS & Registrar and marks what public data shows for each: ok, partial, gap, not visible from outside, or a process control the team has to document itself. Includes DNSSEC, CAA, SPF/DMARC/MTA-STS, locks, expiry and security.txt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_sriLoads a public page and lists every script, stylesheet and preload it pulls in.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Loads a public page and lists every script, stylesheet and preload it pulls in. For third-party files, checks whether an integrity= hash is present and matches, and returns a ready sha384 hash for files that have none.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_domainScores how well a dApp or website domain is protected against hijacking: registrar transfer/update locks, registry lock, DNSSEC, CAA, expiry, nameserver consistency across resolver…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scores how well a dApp or website domain is protected against hijacking: registrar transfer/update locks, registry lock, DNSSEC, CAA, expiry, nameserver consistency across resolvers, SRI on third-party scripts and the Content-Security-Policy header. Returns a 0-100 score, each check with pass/fail/unknown and advice. Results are cached for an hour.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "check_registry_lock" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_registry_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http domain-security https://frontsentinel.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http domain-security https://frontsentinel.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__domain-security__scan_domain",
      "mcp__domain-security__check_registry_lock",
      "mcp__domain-security__check_sri",
      "mcp__domain-security__check_seal_dns_registrar"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as domain-security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__domain-security__scan_domain untrusted-input
  • mcp__domain-security__check_registry_lock untrusted-input
  • mcp__domain-security__check_sri untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__domain-security__check_seal_dns_registrar untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/com.frontsentinel/domain-security/verify?hash=7a9242ec30d5c7253b7dea21ccf7ae6e180f174d5d548d77c19577226d99da86" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7a9242ec30d5, from Oct 23, 2026, 11:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.frontsentinel/domain-security/changes.xml

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Badge

anlyon.dev badge for com.frontsentinel/domain-security
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/com.frontsentinel/domain-security.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.frontsentinel/domain-security)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 11:17 UTC.