Login Vault

by botrecipe.com · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by com.botrecipe

Scoped login vault: your bot signs in to sites without ever seeing the password.

Deletes · 2Changes · 5

Compare Registry entry

11 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 5 change things and 4 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

Deletes or cancels2Claude Code: deny: see these tools
Can't be undone0Claude Code: ask
Changes things5Claude Code: ask: see these tools
Only reads4Claude Code: allow: see these tools

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http vault https://vault.cloudforbots.com/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

11 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Removes, cancels or revokes something.Claude Code: deny

delete_loginOwner only.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_login" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it
Owner only. Delete a saved login, end its open sessions and remove it from every bot key.
revoke_bot_keyOwner only.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "revoke_bot_key" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it
Owner only. Revoke a bot key right away and end every session it opened.

Changes things 5Creates or changes something that can be changed back.Claude Code: ask

create_bot_keyOwner only.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_bot_key" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it
Owner only. Make a per-bot key (vk_...) that can only open sessions on the logins you name. Shown once; we store only its hash. Revoke any time with revoke_bot_key.
end_sessionEnd a session now and wipe its cookies.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it
End a session now and wipe its cookies.
open_sessionSign in with a saved login without seeing it.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "open_session" says "open": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it
Sign in with a saved login without seeing it. The server fills {{username}}, {{password}} and {{totp}} into your form, posts it to url (https, inside the login's allowed hosts), keeps the cookies encrypted, and returns an opaque session id. Checked against the login's scope and daily cap; logged to the audit log. If the site shows a CAPTCHA or new-device check, the reply suggests next_step request_human (Human Handoff relay). Free watch-only logs would_use_vault and signs in nowhere.
save_loginOwner only (your Pro key, never a bot key).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "save_login" says "save": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it
Owner only (your Pro key, never a bot key). Store one login sealed with AES-256-GCM, with a scope: allowed hosts, allowed methods, a daily session cap and session TTL. Run it from your own machine, not inside the bot. The password and TOTP secret are never returned by any tool. Free watch-only stores nothing and logs would_use_vault.
weekly_reportPlain-English summary of the last 7 days: where your bots needed to sign in (by domain), sessions opened, blocked attempts, by bot.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it
Plain-English summary of the last 7 days: where your bots needed to sign in (by domain), sessions opened, blocked attempts, by bot. Read-only. Needs a key.

Only reads 4Looks things up and changes nothing.Claude Code: allow, ask for 1 outbound

audit_logOwner only.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "audit_log" says "log": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it
Owner only. The last uses of your vault: who (bot label), which login, which domain, what happened. Never contains secrets.
list_loginsList saved logins (name, domain, scope, sessions today; never secrets).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_logins" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "secret": it reads secrets.
Description, as the server wrote it
List saved logins (name, domain, scope, sessions today; never secrets). With your owner key it also lists bot keys. A bot key only sees the logins it was granted.
session_fetchMake one request inside an open session.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "session_fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it
Make one request inside an open session. url must be https inside the login's allowed hosts and the method must be in its allowed methods. The password, TOTP secret and codes are redacted from the reply; cookies never leave the vault.
usage_and_upgradeShow today's usage for your key or IP and the $9/month upgrade link.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it
Show today's usage for your key or IP and the $9/month upgrade link. Free tier: 500 calls/day. Not metered.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1: Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.; list_logins
Reads text others write2: Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.; open_session
session_fetch
Can send data out2: Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.; open_session
session_fetch

deny to break every path

{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__vault__list_logins"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable: yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200
tools/list served without credentials: yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7
Protocol version: 2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none
Authorization servers: none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport: no
Dynamic client registration: not observed
Client ID metadata documents: not observed

HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (2 destructive, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
Matched text
https://vault.cloudforbots.com/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_login (destructive), revoke_bot_key (destructive), save_login (write), create_bot_key (write), open_session (write) and 2 more
What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http vault https://vault.cloudforbots.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__vault__list_logins",
      "mcp__vault__audit_log",
      "mcp__vault__usage_and_upgrade"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__vault__save_login",
      "mcp__vault__create_bot_key",
      "mcp__vault__open_session",
      "mcp__vault__session_fetch",
      "mcp__vault__end_session",
      "mcp__vault__weekly_report"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__vault__delete_login",
      "mcp__vault__revoke_bot_key"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vault. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules

mcp__vault__list_logins private-data
mcp__vault__open_session untrusted-input, outbound
mcp__vault__session_fetch untrusted-input, outbound

Keep track

Get told when this server's tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/com.botrecipe/vault/changes.xml

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Anlyon alternative

7 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Compare with other servers for the same product.

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:52 UTC.

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