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PromptGuard

co.promptguard/securitypromptguard.costreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Scan prompts for injection attacks, redact PII, and audit LLM SDK usage from any MCP client

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • promptguard_redactRedact PII (emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys) from text.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Redact PII (emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys) from text. Returns sanitized text with each entity replaced by a labeled placeholder, e.g. [EMAIL_REDACTED], [PHONE_REDACTED], [SSN_REDACTED], and the PII types found. Never returns the original text. Each call counts as one Request on your PromptGuard plan. When to use: Before including user data in LLM prompts, when processing customer messages, or when building RAG pipelines that ingest documents containing personal information.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • promptguard_scan_codeAnalyze code for LLM SDK usage patterns (OpenAI, Anthropic, Cohere, Google Gemini, Bedrock).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "promptguard_scan_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyze code for LLM SDK usage patterns (OpenAI, Anthropic, Cohere, Google Gemini, Bedrock). Detects import statements and client instantiations via pattern matching. When to use: After generating new code that uses LLM SDKs, when reviewing pull requests, or when auditing a codebase for security coverage gaps.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • promptguard_scan_textScan text for security threats including prompt injection, jailbreaks, PII leakage, and toxic content.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan text for security threats including prompt injection, jailbreaks, PII leakage, and toxic content. Returns a decision (allow/block), confidence score, threat type, and reason. Each call counts as one Request on your PromptGuard plan. When to use: When reviewing user-facing prompts, testing LLM inputs for safety, or verifying that content is free of injection attacks before sending to an LLM.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • promptguard_statusShow whether PromptGuard is set up and signed in, with this server's version and the account or configuration details it knows (the hosted server reports your plan; the local CLI s…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "promptguard_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "show" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show whether PromptGuard is set up and signed in, with this server's version and the account or configuration details it knows (the hosted server reports your plan; the local CLI server reports its key type, proxy URL and providers). When to use: To verify PromptGuard is properly configured, or to confirm which version is running.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 5, 2026, 03:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 5, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://api.promptguard.co/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://dev-zefwlqziaprlzc11.us.auth0.com/
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.promptguard.co/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including promptguard_scan_text (write), promptguard_scan_code (write), promptguard_redact (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • Warnpromptguard_scan_code

    The server marks "promptguard_scan_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

All changes to this server

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http security https://api.promptguard.co/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http security https://api.promptguard.co/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__security__promptguard_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__security__promptguard_scan_text",
      "mcp__security__promptguard_scan_code",
      "mcp__security__promptguard_redact"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__security__promptguard_status untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/co.promptguard/security/verify?hash=cea40a23fbda73f69b79490e540d1911c136987b98959eda1db7bc77df840273" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash cea40a23fbda, from Nov 4, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/co.promptguard/security/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 23:17 UTC.