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SSearch

by ssearch.cc · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.3 · published by cc.ssearch

Free web search for AI agents. No API key required. Hosted MCP in active development.

Changes · 1
CompareRegistry entry

8 tools: 1 change things and 7 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

1 check matched something in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http search https://api.ssearch.cc/mcp

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

8 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • forward_canaryDev-only transport proof.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...only delivery status. Never use a real credential."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Dev-only transport proof. Forward a fake canary transiently and return only delivery status. Never use a real credential.
Only reads 7Claude Code: allow, ask for 1 outbound
  • fetch_pageFetch and extract readable page text; optionally fall back to Common Crawl.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_page" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch and extract readable page text; optionally fall back to Common Crawl.
  • get_contextRetrieve only the stored passages in a search result that are relevant to the information you need.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_context" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve only the stored passages in a search result that are relevant to the information you need.
  • get_documentRetrieve the broader stored text for a known SSearch document ID.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_document" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_document" says "get" and "document": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the broader stored text for a known SSearch document ID.
  • search_documentsSearch SSearch-owned stored full-text documents.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_documents" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_documents" says "search" and "document": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search SSearch-owned stored full-text documents. Successful misses can be promoted into the live index.
  • search_planShow the normalized local search plan for a query.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_plan" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show the normalized local search plan for a query.
  • search_sourcesDescribe the local SSearch corpus and search backends.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_sources" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Describe the local SSearch corpus and search backends.
  • search_webSearch SSearch.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_web" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "search_web" says "search" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search SSearch. Set wait_for_coverage to search owned documents and, only if needed, external discovery on a miss.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__search__fetch_page"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.ssearch.cc/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including forward_canary (write)

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http search https://api.ssearch.cc/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__search__search_web",
      "mcp__search__search_documents",
      "mcp__search__get_context",
      "mcp__search__get_document",
      "mcp__search__search_plan",
      "mcp__search__search_sources"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__search__fetch_page",
      "mcp__search__forward_canary"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as search. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__search__search_web untrusted-input
  • mcp__search__search_documents private-data
  • mcp__search__get_document private-data
  • mcp__search__fetch_page untrusted-input, outbound