HumanEndpoint
au.humanendpoint/humanendpointhumanendpoint.austreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Human-only capabilities for AI agents: ground truth, verification, judgement and real-world action.
10 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 3
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
human_cancel_jobCancel an unpaid HumanEndpoint job immediately, or request cancellation of human work that may already be underway and may require refund or operator handling.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_cancel_job" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Cancel an unpaid HumanEndpoint job immediately, or request cancellation of human work that may already be underway and may require refund or operator handling.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
human_reply_to_jobSend additional information to the human operator working on the job, including when the job is waiting for agent input.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_reply_to_job" says "reply": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "human_reply_to_job" says "reply": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send additional information to the human operator working on the job, including when the job is waiting for agent input.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
human_create_jobAccept the human-reviewed commercial terms using the quote_token and create the asynchronous HumanEndpoint job.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_create_job" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.callback_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Accept the human-reviewed commercial terms using the quote_token and create the asynchronous HumanEndpoint job. Creating the job starts a workflow that may lead to human execution in the real world after required payment. Store the returned job_token because it is required for later reads and control.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
human_policy_preflightCheck whether a proposed human task is eligible before requesting a quote or spending funds.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether a proposed human task is eligible before requesting a quote or spending funds.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
human_request_quoteSubmit a request for human-reviewed terms for a real-world task whose cost depends on scope, feasibility, urgency or conditions.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_request_quote" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.callback_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a request for human-reviewed terms for a real-world task whose cost depends on scope, feasibility, urgency or conditions. This sends the request into a HumanEndpoint workflow for review by a human operator, but does not commit funds or start execution. HumanEndpoint returns commercial terms that can be accepted or declined before payment. Provide callback_url to receive signed quote.offered or quote.declined webhooks instead of relying only on polling. Suitable tasks include calling a business for current price, stock, lead time or availability; retrieving information only available by phone; verifying a real-world fact; checking AI output; applying human judgement; doing bounded research; or carrying out a physical-world task. If no named service matches, set service_slug to custom-human-task.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
human_get_jobRetrieve job status, messages, history, payment state, expense accounting, result and evidence.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_get_job" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "message": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve job status, messages, history, payment state, expense accounting, result and evidence.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
human_get_quoteRetrieve a human-reviewed quote.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_get_quote" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve a human-reviewed quote. Polling is always available as a fallback even when the quote request supplied callback_url. When status=offered, inspect the operator's service fee, expense authority and expiry. Creating the job accepts those terms. When declined, inspect the reason before deciding whether to resubmit.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
human_list_evidenceList evidence artifacts and SHA-256 hashes for a secured human job.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_list_evidence" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List evidence artifacts and SHA-256 hashes for a secured human job. Download paths require the same job token.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
human_list_expensesList pass-through expense requests for a secured job, including exact amount, payment status and receipt metadata.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_list_expenses" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List pass-through expense requests for a secured job, including exact amount, payment status and receipt metadata.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
human_list_servicesDiscover human capabilities for tasks software cannot complete alone: call a business, supplier or organisation; check current price, stock, lead time or availability by phone; obt…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "human_list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Discover human capabilities for tasks software cannot complete alone: call a business, supplier or organisation; check current price, stock, lead time or availability by phone; obtain information that is only available by speaking to a person; verify a physical fact or location in the real world; independently review AI output; apply human judgement; perform bounded manual research; or carry out another lawful physical-world action. Results are structured and can include evidence. If no listed capability fits, use custom-human-task.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
18 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_get_job"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://humanendpoint.au/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including human_cancel_job (destructive), human_reply_to_job (irreversible), human_policy_preflight (write), human_request_quote (write), human_create_job (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http humanendpoint https://humanendpoint.au/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http humanendpoint https://humanendpoint.au/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_list_services",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_get_quote",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_get_job",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_list_expenses",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_list_evidence"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_policy_preflight",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_request_quote",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_create_job",
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_reply_to_job"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__humanendpoint__human_cancel_job"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as humanendpoint. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__humanendpoint__human_list_services untrusted-input
- mcp__humanendpoint__human_request_quote untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__humanendpoint__human_create_job untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__humanendpoint__human_get_job private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__humanendpoint__human_reply_to_job untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__humanendpoint__human_cancel_job untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/au.humanendpoint/humanendpoint/verify?hash=a28616b7345a52745f5c6e320a90aba72c6f0d771a550db70a34c7b570a5a423" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a28616b7345a, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:43 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/au.humanendpoint/humanendpoint/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/au.humanendpoint/humanendpoint)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.