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Can my AI agent sign up?

app.tuper/agent-signupstuper.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Can an AI agent sign up to X? 58 services tested: Cloudflare, captcha, phone or terms gates.

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Anlyon alternative

Run the operations that matter as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_signup_gatesList the 58 tested services, optionally filtered by gate: blocked, admitted, or one of works, api, cloudflare, turnstile, captcha, rejected, phone, google, tos, person.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_signup_gates" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the 58 tested services, optionally filtered by gate: blocked, admitted, or one of works, api, cloudflare, turnstile, captcha, rejected, phone, google, tos, person. Also counts per gate.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • lookup_signup_gateLook up one service, e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_signup_gate" says "lookup": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up one service, e.g. "Slack", "Polar", "Reddit", "Product Hunt", "Bluesky": whether our real AI agent was admitted or blocked, the gate (Cloudflare, Turnstile, reCAPTCHA, phone, terms), the date tested and what worked instead. Not in the table: says so and points to the free probe skill.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-signups https://mcp-signups.tuper.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-signups https://mcp-signups.tuper.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-signups__lookup_signup_gate",
      "mcp__agent-signups__list_signup_gates"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-signups. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/app.tuper/agent-signups/verify?hash=875effd81de86acede31b4bbca79a2f77fda64069d4182900f7da100e4526de3" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 875effd81de8, from Nov 2, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://anlyon.dev/servers/app.tuper/agent-signups/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

anlyon.dev badge for app.tuper/agent-signups
[![anlyon.dev](https://anlyon.dev/badge/app.tuper/agent-signups.svg)](https://anlyon.dev/servers/app.tuper/agent-signups)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 2, 2026, 14:17 UTC.