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app.botnotice/mcp

by botnotice.app · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by app.botnotice

AI disclosure laws by business and state, each law in full, and a website AI-notice check.

Changes · 1

4 tools: 1 change things and 3 only read.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http botnotice https://botnotice.app/mcp

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

4 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • laws_for_businessGiven how a business uses AI and where its customers are, returns the laws in force and the ones coming, each with what must be disclosed, when, the penalties and the sources, plus…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given how a business uses AI and where its customers are, returns the laws in force and the ones coming, each with what must be disclosed, when, the penalties and the sources, plus the notice rules that satisfy all of them. Free, no account. Not legal advice.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Claude Code: allow, ask for 1 outbound
  • check_websiteReads a public website: which chat or voice-AI tools it runs, whether an AI disclosure is already shown, and, for the business described, which laws that leaves unmet.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "chat": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "check_website" says "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads a public website: which chat or voice-AI tools it runs, whether an AI disclosure is already shown, and, for the business described, which laws that leaves unmet. The same check as the free scan at botnotice.app/scan, without the browser pass. Not legal advice.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_lawThe full record for one law: who must comply, what to disclose, timing, duties, exemptions, penalties, enforcement, sources and the last-verified date.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_law" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The full record for one law: who must comply, what to disclose, timing, duties, exemptions, penalties, enforcement, sources and the last-verified date. Slugs come from list_laws or the dataset at https://botnotice.app/datasets/ai-disclosure-laws.json.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_lawsEvery AI disclosure law BotNotice tracks (U.S.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_laws" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every AI disclosure law BotNotice tracks (U.S. states, federal, EU, UK), with status and effective date, optionally filtered. Also the pending bills.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__botnotice__check_website"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
none
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
none
Authorization servers
none
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://botnotice.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including laws_for_business (write)

    What this check looks for

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http botnotice https://botnotice.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__botnotice__get_law",
      "mcp__botnotice__list_laws"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__botnotice__laws_for_business",
      "mcp__botnotice__check_website"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as botnotice. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__botnotice__check_website private-data, untrusted-input, outbound