Skip to content

ai.tachyo/verify

by tachyo.ai · remote · no sign-in to list tools · v1.0.0 · published by ai.tachyo

Cryptographic proof of wallet ownership in two steps, with no keys and no custody.

Changes · 2
CompareRegistry entry

2 tools: 2 change things.

Scanned Oct 21, 2026

No check matched anything in the tool definitions. No finding is not a safety guarantee. How the checks work.

claude mcp add --transport http verify https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify

Tools

Open a tool for its reasons and full description. Descriptions are the publisher's own words, shown as they are.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • request_verification_challengeStep 1 of wallet verification: get a fresh challenge for the user to sign.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_verification_challenge" says "request": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1 of wallet verification: get a fresh challenge for the user to sign. chain: "evm" or "solana". Pass agent_id (your marketplace identity) so the proof is bound to you. Present `challenge` to the user, have their wallet sign it (EVM personal_sign / Solana signMessage), then call verify_wallet_ownership with the returned `nonce` + signature. The challenge is single-use and expires (~10 min). Returns {challenge, nonce, expires_at}.
  • verify_wallet_ownershipStep 2 of wallet verification: prove control by signing the challenge from step 1.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2 of wallet verification: prove control by signing the challenge from step 1. chain: "evm" (secp256k1, 0x-hex signature) or "solana" (ed25519, base58/base64/hex). `nonce` is from request_verification_challenge; the signature must be over that exact challenge text. Pass the same agent_id you requested the challenge with — on success the wallet is linked to you and you get a session_token to pass to Tachyo's other agents (e.g. check_token_safety) to unlock connected/premium tiers. Returns {verified, address, chain, linked, session_token?, session_expires?}. Does not move funds or expose keys.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http verify https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__verify__request_verification_challenge",
      "mcp__verify__verify_wallet_ownership"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. It assumes the server is installed as verify. Review it before you use it.