Revuo
ai.revuo/revuorevuo.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Agent-callable B2B SaaS directory: capability-structured, continuously verified listings.
14 tools: 3 change things and 11 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 14
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
14 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
directory.overviewSingle 'call this first' entry-point that briefs an agent on the entire Revuo directory.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Single 'call this first' entry-point that briefs an agent on the entire Revuo directory. Returns the taxonomy with subcategories, product counts per category, locked-vertical flags (the three verticals Revuo prioritizes), capability slugs valid per category, the canonical capability-kind taxonomy (integration/compliance/format/standard/workflow), and product-bound agent surfaces (mcpServer, agentSkill, grokBot). Surfaces are a property of a product — they are NOT category slugs. Use this once at the start of a session to ground every subsequent products.search / products.find_by_capability / tools.find_for_task call. Response: { directory: { name, tagline, url, policyUrl, capabilityKinds[] }, lockedVerticals[], categories[] (each with subcategories[], productCount, isLockedVertical, capabilitySlugs[]), surfaces[] (kind, description, listedOn=product), tools: { ...tool-name hints } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
mcp.score_serverScore an MCP server against the Revuo quality rubric.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Score an MCP server against the Revuo quality rubric. Pass either a product slug (scored from cached probe data on the product's direct-probe MCP entry; fast) OR an endpoint URL (probed live). Returns: { target, server, summary { coreAwarded/Max/Percent, extensionAwarded/Max/Percent, probedAt }, categories[] (ServerMetadata, CapabilityQuality, ConfigurationUX, RevuoExtensions), checks[] (every rubric check with awarded/max/passed/evaluated/fixSuggestion/evidence), topFixes[] (failed checks ranked by points-at-stake), probe (probe diagnostics) }. Core score (max 100) is Smithery-comparable. Extension score covers Revuo-specific signals (response time today; freshness, error envelope, schema stability are not yet implemented and report evaluated=false — excluded from totals, never counted as a failure). A check with evaluated=false is a Revuo gap, not the server's fault. Errors: { error: { code: 'bad_input'|'not_found', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tools.changesDetect whether a product's MCP tool schema has DRIFTED since you cached it — rug-pull / tool-poisoning detection (a server silently changing a tool's description or input schema af…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Detect whether a product's MCP tool schema has DRIFTED since you cached it — rug-pull / tool-poisoning detection (a server silently changing a tool's description or input schema after you approved it; web search structurally cannot answer this). Pass the product slug and EITHER the schema hash you cached earlier (knownHash, from products.get_mcp_setup → server.schema.hash — the strongest signal: an exact mismatch means the tools changed) OR the ISO-8601 timestamp you cached at (since). With neither, it returns the current fingerprint to cache for next time. A product may expose MULTIPLE servers: knownHash is per-server, so pass `server` (a qualifiedName) with knownHash on a multi-server product — otherwise knownHash is applied only when there's exactly one server. Re-verify before trusting a previously-approved tool. Response: { product, hasMcpSupport, drifted (did ANY tracked server change vs your reference; null when no reference given), servers[] (each: qualifiedName, currentSchemaHash, schemaStable, lastSchemaChangeAt, toolCount, directlyProbed, driftedSinceKnownHash, driftedSince, advice) }. Errors: { error: { code: 'not_found'|'bad_input', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 11Show 11 read-only tools
categories.listLists all product categories in the directory.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "categories.list" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "directory": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Lists all product categories in the directory. Use category slugs to filter product searches in products.search / products.find_by_capability. Response: { categories: [{ slug, name, description }] }. Note: this is a thin call. For a full directory briefing (subcategories, capability slugs per category, product counts, locked-vertical flags), prefer directory.overview as a single up-front call.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
products.find_agent_readyFind products with the highest agent readiness scores — products that are easiest for AI agents to integrate with.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "products.find_agent_ready" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find products with the highest agent readiness scores — products that are easiest for AI agents to integrate with. Sorted by compositeScore desc; supports skip/limit pagination. All readiness scores are 0-100, higher better. Calibration: <30 = not agent-ready (default minimumScore filter), 30-49 = early/limited, 50-69 = decent, 70-89 = strong, 90+ = exceptional. Ranking basis: compositeScore desc. Tier is NOT a tiebreaker here — buyer intent is technical fit, not paid placement. Every result carries { position (1-based, within the returned page), rank (0..1; 1.0 = top of this page) } so callers can merge results across tools consistently. Response: { products: [{ position, rank, slug, name, tagline, websiteUrl, tier (free|verified|featured), unverified (true when no approved vendor claim), verifiedAt (ISO; nullable), agentReadiness: { compositeScore, apiScore, protocolScore, sdkScore, integrationScore, dxScore } (each 0-100), mcp?: { hasMcpSupport, totalToolCount, serverCount } }] }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
products.find_by_capabilityFind B2B SaaS products that support a specific capability — an integration with a named service ('salesforce-integration'), a data format ('xrechnung-support'), an industry standar…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "products.find_by_capability" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find B2B SaaS products that support a specific capability — an integration with a named service ('salesforce-integration'), a data format ('xrechnung-support'), an industry standard ('eclass-support'), or a compliance certification ('soc2'). Accepts either a canonical capability slug or natural language; resolves to a structured capability when possible. Ranking basis: currentScore desc (computed editorial score), then name. Paid tier is NOT a ranking input — it appears only as an annotation. Every result carries { position (1-based), rank (0..1; 1.0 = top, scales linearly down by ordinal position) } so callers can merge results across tools consistently. Response: { capability, matchType (none|exactSlug|canonicalSlug|nlpFallback — exactSlug & canonicalSlug are deterministic; nlpFallback is heuristic), resolvedFeatures[], products[] }. Each product: { position, rank, slug, name, tagline, websiteUrl, tier, unverified (true when no approved vendor claim), verifiedAt, evidence[] (per-claim: featureSlug, evidenceUrl, notes, source, confidence) }. Empty: { capability, matchType, message, suggestedSlugs[] } when no capability matched, or products: [] when capability matched but no products claim it yet.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
products.getGet full details for a product by slug, including MCP integration data, product-bound agent artifacts (Agent Skills, Grok Bots), and agent readiness scores.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "products.get" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get full details for a product by slug, including MCP integration data, product-bound agent artifacts (Agent Skills, Grok Bots), and agent readiness scores. Agent artifacts are a property of the product — not directory categories. Response: { product: { slug, name, tagline, description, websiteUrl, logoUrl, pricingModel, currentScore (0-100), tier (free|verified|featured), unverified (true when no approved vendor claim), verifiedAt (ISO; absent if never crawled), categories[], knownLimitations?[] (sourced weaknesses, each with evidenceUrl — weigh before recommending), alternatives?[] (neutral, score-ranked same-category options, self excluded, houseProduct disclosed) }, mcp?: { hasMcpSupport, totalToolCount, totalUseCount, servers[] }, agentArtifacts[] (kind agentSkill|grokBot, install URLs, related product slugs), agentReadiness?: { compositeScore (0-100), aiSummary } }. Errors: { error: { code: 'not_found', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
products.get_mcp_setupGet MCP server setup instructions for a product.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "products.get_mcp_setup" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get MCP server setup instructions for a product. Returns available servers, their tools, connection details, and whether they support remote (hosted) access. Each server carries a machine-usable connect block: { transport ('http'|'local'), url, mcpJson (paste-ready snippet), claudeMcpAddCommand (`claude mcp add ...`), installLinkUrl (a tracked link that routes through Revuo for vendor attribution, then redirects to the product) }. For remote servers use mcpJson/claudeMcpAddCommand directly; for local servers follow repositoryUrl. Each server also carries schema { hash, stable, lastChangeAt } — cache the hash and pass it to tools.changes(knownHash) later to detect tool-schema drift (rug-pull / tool-poisoning). Response when MCP support exists: { product: { slug, name, websiteUrl, tier, unverified, verifiedAt }, hasMcpSupport: true, totalToolCount, servers[], agentReadiness? }. Response when product exists but lacks MCP: { product: {...}, hasMcpSupport: false, message }. Errors: { error: { code: 'not_found', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
products.searchSearch for B2B SaaS products by name OR by capability.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "products.search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search for B2B SaaS products by name OR by capability. The query is first resolved against the canonical capability taxonomy (e.g. 'salesforce-integration', 'xrechnung-support', 'soc2'); on hit, products that claim that capability are returned. Falls back to name/slug/tagline substring search. Optional category scope. Ranking basis: currentScore desc (computed editorial score), then name. Paid tier is NOT a ranking input — tier appears only as an annotation on results. Every result carries { position (1-based), rank (0..1; 1.0 = top, scales linearly down by ordinal position) } so callers can merge results across tools consistently. Response: { query, matchType (none|exactSlug|canonicalSlug|nlpFallback), resolvedCapabilities[], products[] }. Each product carries { position, rank, tier (free|verified|featured — annotation only), houseProduct (true = built by Revuo's founder; conflict-of-interest disclosure), sponsored (true = paid Featured placement), unverified (true when the listing has no approved vendor claim; omitted otherwise — absence means an approved vendor claim, NOT crawl freshness; use verifiedAt for that), verifiedAt (ISO timestamp of last claim crawl; absent if never crawled), currentScore (0-100), compositeScore (agent-readiness 0-100, nullable), matchedCapability (true if surfaced by capability path) }. Errors: { error: { code: 'not_found'|'bad_input', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
rankings.getGet the published editorial ranking ("Best {Category}") for a category.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "rankings.get" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the published editorial ranking ("Best {Category}") for a category. Ordering basis: computed editorial score ONLY (verified capability coverage, evidence verification rate & freshness, agent readiness, data completeness — weights published at /api/methodology). Tier is NOT a ranking input for this tool; positions are never sold. Rankings are published snapshots (monthly schedule; manual publishes are marked) — stable between recomputes and citable. Each entry carries { position, rank (0..1), slug, name, score (0-100), breakdown (raw 0-100 per dimension), tier (annotation only), houseProduct (true = built by Revuo's founder — same formula as everyone, disclosed machine-readably), unverified, verifiedAt }. unrankedCount + unranked[] name the category products that failed an eligibility gate, with reasons. Response: { category, computedAt, methodologyVersion, methodologyUrl, trigger, entries[], unranked[] }. Errors: { error: { code: 'not_found', ... } } — also returned when a category has no published ranking yet.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tools.find_for_taskFind the best MCP tools for a given task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tools.find_for_task" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find the best MCP tools for a given task. Describe what you want to accomplish (e.g. 'manage github issues', 'send slack messages', 'query a database') and get ranked results — each result is one (product, tool) pair, since same-named tools across providers are NOT interchangeable. By default only shows tools available via remote (network-hosted) servers. Audience: agent builders looking for installable MCP tools — for B2B SaaS recommendations, prefer products.search or products.find_by_capability. Ranking basis: relevance score desc (+1 per term hit, +3 for full-phrase hit); within an equal relevance tier, callable-now (Open access) + remote + healthy tools are boosted ahead — never a hard filter (a product-bound tool stays in its own money query), then productName. Paid tier is NOT a ranking input — it appears only as an annotation. Every result carries { position (1-based), rank (0..1; 1.0 = top, scales linearly down by ordinal position) } plus preflight annotations { accessModel (open|keyed|account|commercial), healthScore (0-100, nullable), readOnly, destructive, callableNow (true = usable anonymously right now), setup (one-line 'how to get access' pointer for non-Open tools) }. Response: { task, matchType (none|exactSlug|canonicalSlug|nlpFallback), resolvedCapabilities[], capabilityProducts[] (B2B SaaS products that claim the same capability — empty when matchType=none), results[] (MCP-tool-level matches), buckets { callableNow, requiresSetup } }. Each result: { position, rank, normalizedName, displayName, description, inputSchema, relevance, accessModel, healthScore, readOnly, destructive, callableNow, setup, productSlug, productName, serverQualifiedName, isRemoteCapable, tier, unverified, verifiedAt }. Empty case: { task, matchType, message, suggestedQueries[], suggestedCapabilities[] }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tools.getGet detailed information about a specific MCP tool, scoped to one product.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tools.get" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get detailed information about a specific MCP tool, scoped to one product. Pass both the productSlug and the tool name — same-named tools across products are distinct. Response: { tool: { normalizedName, displayName, description, inputSchema, productSlug, productName, serverQualifiedName, isRemoteCapable, accessModel, healthScore, readOnly, destructive, tier, unverified, verifiedAt, position (always 1), rank (always 1.0) } }. Errors: { error: { code: 'not_found', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tools.list_by_nameList every (product, tool) pair that shares a normalized name.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tools.list_by_name" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List every (product, tool) pair that shares a normalized name. A disambiguation lookup — same name across providers does NOT mean the tools are interchangeable. Ranking basis: productName. Paid tier is NOT a ranking input — it appears only as an annotation. Every result carries { position (1-based), rank (0..1) } plus preflight annotations { accessModel, healthScore, readOnly, destructive }. Response: { normalizedName, total, tools[] (each: position, rank, productSlug, productName, displayName, description, inputSchema, serverQualifiedName, isRemoteCapable, accessModel, healthScore, readOnly, destructive, tier, unverified, verifiedAt) }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
tools.searchSearch for MCP tools by capability.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tools.search" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search for MCP tools by capability. Each result is one (product, tool) pair — tools sharing a name across providers are NOT interchangeable, so each provider's tool is its own row with its own description and input schema. Ranking basis: semantic relevance to the query (embedding search); on the lexical fallback (searchMode='lexical') results are name-ordered and rank does NOT reflect relevance. Paid tier is NOT a ranking input — it appears only as an annotation. Every result carries { position (1-based), rank (0..1; 1.0 = top) } so callers can merge results across tools consistently, plus preflight annotations { accessModel (open|keyed|account|commercial; whether an agent can call it without becoming a customer first), healthScore (0-100, nullable), readOnly, destructive } so you can judge callability and safety BEFORE selecting. Optional access filter narrows to a single access class. Response: { searchMode ('semantic'|'lexical'), tools: [{ position, rank, normalizedName, displayName, description, inputSchema, productSlug, productName, serverQualifiedName, isRemoteCapable, accessModel, healthScore, readOnly, destructive, tier, unverified (true when no approved vendor claim), verifiedAt (ISO; nullable) }] }. Errors: { error: { code: 'bad_input', ... } }.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
14 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write14
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__revuo__mcp_score_server"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Oct 22, 2026, 14:20 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://www.revuo.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.revuo.ai/api/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including mcp.score_server (write), directory.overview (write), tools.changes (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http revuo https://www.revuo.ai/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http revuo https://www.revuo.ai/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__revuo__tools_get",
"mcp__revuo__categories_list",
"mcp__revuo__products_get_mcp_setup",
"mcp__revuo__products_get",
"mcp__revuo__tools_find_for_task",
"mcp__revuo__rankings_get",
"mcp__revuo__tools_search",
"mcp__revuo__tools_list_by_name",
"mcp__revuo__products_search",
"mcp__revuo__products_find_agent_ready",
"mcp__revuo__products_find_by_capability"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__revuo__mcp_score_server",
"mcp__revuo__directory_overview",
"mcp__revuo__tools_changes"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as revuo. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 14 rules
- mcp__revuo__tools_get untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__categories_list private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__mcp_score_server untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__revuo__products_get_mcp_setup untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__products_get untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__tools_find_for_task untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__directory_overview untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__rankings_get untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__tools_search untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__tools_list_by_name untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__tools_changes untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__products_search untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__products_find_agent_ready untrusted-input
- mcp__revuo__products_find_by_capability untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://anlyon.dev/api/v1/servers/ai.revuo/revuo/verify?hash=5019241347e6e3ae6ebb885df2d323c96a52060fe64abaebdf2e1441f5a691e0" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5019241347e6, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:41 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://anlyon.dev/servers/ai.revuo/revuo/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://anlyon.dev/servers/ai.revuo/revuo)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:43 UTC.